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This study aims to synthesise the land refonn programme in South Africa in tenns of its 
multifaceted political and legal policy origins, arrangements and the implementation thereof, 
with due regard to the intemationallessons and experiences. The political aspects of the 
process are given due consideration as they are often linked to the socio--economic aspects of 
the land refonn process. The fact is that the South African government's attempts at land 
refonn have thus far failed to live up to expectations. This study proposes equity-sharing 
schemes in general and farm worker equity-share schemes in particular as viable modes of 
land redistribution. There is also a particular focus on the appropriate institutional 
environment, which is required for a successful and sustainable transfer of ownership and 
control. Furthennore, the government needs to provide extensive support for the rural poor 
who have been to a large extent rationed out from the current land refonn process. Ultimately, 
it is conceded that for the next decade at least the targeted beneficiaries of the land refonn 
programme in South Africa that is, "the rural poor, women, and the landless", will have to 
wait, as has been the case for many developing nations, to receive what will probably be a 
very small gain, in tenns of what was promised and expected after political freedom was 
attained in 1994. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In South Africa, land is presently not only one of the most defininKPolitical and 
develo mel!~ issues, but also perhaps the most intractable. The continuing_~acial 
misdistribution of land will either be resolved through a fundamental restructuring of 
the government's land reform programme, or it will be resolved by a fundamental 
restructuring of property relations by the people themselves. Which direction the 
country follows depends to a large degree on the urgent and immediate 
responsiveness of the government to the needs and demands of the country's 19-
million mostly poor, black and landless rural people (Thwala, 2003, p.1). 
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The first post-apartheid South African government aimed to establish democratic 
institutions and prosperity in a non-racial society. Pensions, housing subsidies and 
land reform were to launch the process of equitable and sustainable development. But 
the sheer scale of pq~~r:!y, the legacy of apartheid, and the competitive global 
~ economy meant that progress was slow. The need for land reform was simple. White 
South African government policies had resulted in a dualistic and unequal system. On 
\. one hand there existed heavily subsidised, highly mechanised white farms on the most 
I fertile land available, whilst the black population survived in overcrowded infertile 
homelands on the other (Deininger et aI, 1999). 
This study examines secondary literature based on the land reform programme in 
South Africa, which is investigated from both a theoretical and practical perspective. 
Firstly, a broad foundation is developed for South Africa by focusing on the general 
objectives and international experience with land reform using various examples. 
Thereafter, an economic framework for South Africa is shaped from a theoretical 
perspective. The land reform programme in South Africa is then given a detailed 
overview, with the elements, role of other stakeholders and the latest national 
developments being the primary areas of focus. After discussing the land reform 
programme, the focus is shifted to the barriers faced by beneficiaries in participating 
in the programme. Finally, the study is summarised and recommendations are 
provided for the land reform process in the South African context. 
/ 
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1.2 DEFINITION OF LAND REFORM AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 
Broadly speaking, the concept of "reform" implies change through intervention or an 
intended improvement. Land reform is essentially a state initiative to modify, redirect 
or change rights, usage and relations on land, especially in rural areas (Marcus et aI, 
1996, p.179). According to Adams, "land reform in its simplest sense is generally 
accepted to mean the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of the 
landless, tenants and farm labourers" (1995, p.1). 
Land reform usually entails a redistribution of the rights of ownership or use of land 
away from large landowners in favour of cultivators with very limited or no land-
holdings. It can take various forms: the transfer of ownership to tenants who already 
work the land to create family farms as in Japan and Taiwan; transfer ofland from 
large estates to small farms as in Mexico; rural cooperatives in Cuba; state farms like 
Peru or the appropriation of large estates for new settlement as was the case in Kenya. 
All go under the heading of land reform and are designed for fulfil one central 
function: the transfer of land ownership or control directly to the people who actually 
work the land (Todaro and Smith, 2003). 
The two main traditions ofland reform are collectivisation, typically favoured by 
communist and socialist movements and regimes and the creation of a smallholding 
peasantry (the family farm), usually favoured by those who work for constitutional 
democratic government. Whether collectivisation or smallholding is introduced (and 
there are as many variations in detail as there are efforts at reform), the goal is to 
improve material conditions for desperately poor peasants while reducing 
environmental degradation, easing population growth and slowing urbanization all in 
such a manner that the party or regime bringing about the changes creates an agrarian 
political base of support (Smith, 2002). 
As land reform is a complex process, a number of related terms should be defined. 
Property rights are multidimensional continua of rights and obligations associated 
with land ownership and tenancies (Barraclough, 1998, p.6). They define actions that 
individuals can take in relation to other individuals regarding some "thing" (Ostrom, 
1998, p.5). If one has a right, someone else has a commensurate duty to observe that 
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right. Property exists at a number of levels, both within a social group like a 
household or community, and without it and acts as recognition that the property 
interest of one party is protected by a right only when others fulfil their duty to respect 
that right (Buckle, 1995, p.65 cited in Drimie, 2000, p.25). 
Tenure, which is often synonymous with property rights, can be described as being 
composed of a bundle of rights, many specific to do certain things with land. 
According to Adams et al (1999, p.1), these land rights may include one or more of 
the following: 
• Rights to occupy a homestead, or to use land for annual and perennial crops, to 
make permanent improvements, to bury the dead, and to have access for 
utilising the natural resource base; 
• Rights to transact, give, mortgage, lease, rent and bequeath areas of exclusive 
use; 
• Rights to exclude others from the above-listed rights, at community and/or 
individual levels; and 
• Rights to enforcement of legal and administrative provisions in order to 
protect the rights holder. 
A land tenure system is all types of tenure that are recognised by the national or local 
system oflaw. Land tenure systems reflect specific historical, geographical, economic, 
social and political conditions and are continually modified in the process of economic 
development (Domer, 1972, p.36 cited in Drimie, 2000, p.25). These systems are 
sometimes classified in a typology of state property, private property, common 
property, or open access (non-property) as summarised by Bromley (1991, p.31) in 
Table 1.1 (Next Page). 
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Table 1.1: The four types of property regimes 
State property Individuals have a duty to observe use / access rules 
determined by controlling / managing agency. Agencies 
have the right to determine use / access rules. 
Private property Individuals have the right to undertake socially 
acceptable uses, and have a duty to refrain from socially 
unacceptable uses. Others (called "non-owners") have a 
duty to refrain from preventing socially acceptable uses, 
and have a right to expect only socially acceptable ones 
Common property The management group (the "owners") has the right to 
exclude non-members, and non-members have a duty 
to abide by the exclusion. Individual members of the 
management group (the "co-owners") have both rights 
and duties with respect to use rates and maintenance of 
the thing owned. 
Open access No defined group of users or "owners" and so the 
benefit stream is available to anyone. Individuals have 
both privilege and no right with respect to use rates and 
maintenance of the asset. The asset is an "open access 
resource". 
Source: Bromley, 1991, p.31. 
'Land reform' and 'agrarian reform' are often used interchangeably. Agrarian reform, a 
construct of the Cold War to counter 'communist' land reform, embraces 
improvements in both land tenure and agricultural organisation. Its policy 
prescriptions urged governments to go beyond redistribution: they should also support 
other rural development measures, such as the improvement of farm credit, 
cooperatives for farm-input supply and marketing, and extension services to facilitate 
the productive use of the land reallocated. Whilst conceptually sound, the danger with 
these wider prescriptions is that they may discourage governments from doing 
anything until they can do everything (Adams, 1995, p.l). 
1.3 HISTORICAL BASIS FOR LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Relocation and segregation of blacks from whites started as early as 1658, when the 
Khoi were informed that they could no longer dwell to the west of the Salt and 
Liesbeck rivers, and in the 1800's, when the first reserves were proclaimed by the 
\ 
British and the Boer governments (Human Awareness Programme 1989 cited in 
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Thwala, 2003, p.1). The Native Land Act was also passed in 1913. This Act restricted 
the area of land for lawful African occupation, and stripped African cash tenants and 
sharecroppers of their land and consequently replaced sharecropping and rent- tenant 
contracts with labour tenancy. The Native Land Act resulted in only 10 percent of the 
land reserved for blacks. 
In 1923, a principle of separate residential areas in urban locations was established, 
and this principle was extended by the Group Areas Act of 1950. In an attempt to deal 
with problems of forcing more people to live on small areas of land, betterment 
planning was introduced. This included cattle-culling, fencing off of fields and 
grazing land from residential areas, and the moving of people into villages set away 
from farming areas (Thwala, 2003, p.3) 
In 1936, the Development Trust and Land Act was passed. This Act allocated already 
promised land to the reserves. Squatting was also made illegal. In 1937, the Natives 
Laws Amendment Act was also enacted to prohibit Africans from buying land in 
urban areas. Furthermore, the Group Areas Act was promulgated in 1950. This Act 
racially segregated areas with respect to residence and business and controlled 
interracial property actions. In a further attempt to ensure separate and unequal 
development, the Bantu Authorities Act was passed in 1951. This Act allowed the 
establishment of tribal, regional and territorial authorities. Also, to ensure complete 
illegality of squatting, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act was passed in 1951. 
This Act allowed the government to establish resettlement camps for surplus people 
evicted from white farms. The Blacks Resettlement Act was also passed in 1954 to 
give the state the authority to remove Africans from any area in the magisterial district 
of Johannesburg and adjacent areas. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 
was also enacted in 1959 to establish the 'Bantustans' and make the reserves the 
political homeland of Black South Africans. In the early 1960's, the first relocation 
camps were established. This was an attempt to remove displaced labour tenants, 
unwanted farm workers and unemployed urban people (Thwala, 2003, p.4). 
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Historically, land has been a source of conflict and contention in South Africa. 
Colonial and Apartheid policies disposed millions of black South African oftheir land 
moved them into overcrowded and impoverished reserves, homeland and townships. 
It has been estimated that 3.5 million people were forcibly removed from their land 
between 1960 and 1982 alone (Surplus People Project, 1983). These racially- based 
land policies caused great discontent amongst black people and also resulted in 
inefficient urban and rural land use patterns and a fragmented system of land use 
administration. According to Aliber and Mokoena (2003, p.330), "on the eve of the 
1994 elections, whites controlled about 84 percent of non- public land, while blacks 
controlled only about 16 percent, primarily in 'homelands' and coloured reserves." 
Naturally, land reform was held to be a cornerstone of the transformation process with 
the dawn of democracy in South Africa. As clarified in the 1993 framework document 
for the African National Congress (ANC's) Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) and in the ANC's election manifesto, land reform encompassed 
both economic and social objectives individually as well being part of the overall 
process of historical redress (Aliber and Mokoena, 2003, p.330). 
1.4 THE NEGOTIATED ROOTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S LAND REFORM 
As early as 1993, the World Bank, arguably the institution most dedicated to the 
protection of private property rights in the world, warned that if post- apartheid South 
Africa did not undertake a large- scale reorganization of the rural economy the 
country faced the danger of rural violence, and possibly even civil war. It was against 
this backdrop and amid growing concerns about the need to inspire the confidence of 
foreign investors in a rapidly globalising world economy that South Africa's 
mUltiparty constitutional negotiators approached the thorny question of whether and 
how to reverse the centuries old racial misdistribution of the country's 122 million 
hectares of land. 
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The challenge was tremendous: On the one hand, the ANC's Government- in- waiting 
needed to fulfil its 1955 Freedom Charter promise to reverse the Apartheid landscape 
which had put 87 percent of land in the hands of 60 000 white farmers and the state, 
while millions of Black people eked out a living in overcrowded conditions on the 
remaining 13 percent. On the other hand, transforming the rural landscape and the 
racially separated urban settlement patterns while ensuring continued food self-
sufficiency, creating an investor- friendly environment, promoting economic growth 
and fostering national racial reconciliation presented multiple and interlinked 
challenges (Thwala, 2003, p.1 0). 
At this stage it is important to also note that the National Party, was proactive in 
reorganising land ownership prior to democracy. Land was used as a political 
bargaining chip with little regard for principle. In the lead- up to the first democratic 
elections, communal land in a number of areas around the country was transferred 
directly into the control of the traditional authorities. In 1992, the government 
gazetted the transfer of 380000 hectares ofland to the Lebowa homeland and 52 000 
hectares to the QwaQwa homeland (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1994, 
p.225). In KwaZulu- Natal, the Ingonyama Trust was set up and signed into law less 
than a month before the first democratic elections in 1994. Ninety-five per cent of the 
former KwaZulu homeland (1 .2 million hectares) was put under control of the King. 
This is widely viewed as having being a trade-off for the participation of the IFP in 
the 1994 elections (Wood, 2000, p.188). 
In preparing for governance underlying the policy details were two key strategies that 
have characterised the ANC's approach to development and growth since the early 
1990's. These have become more clearly defined, particularly since the start of Thabo 
Mbeki's term as President. The first strategy in the ANC's developmental approach 
was a 'state- assisted market' model of development and redistribution, with the 
market serving as the primary mechanism for the allocation of goods and services. 
Placing the market at the centre in this manner ensures economic continuity and a 
limited disruption of the inherited economy while efforts are made to redistribute 
opportunities and resources. Nevertheless, in this model the state does intervene in 
two crucial ways. First, it plays a welfare role on the margins ofthe economy to 
facilitate entry into markets for those without their own resources, primarily through a 
system of grants and subsidies. Second, the power and resources of the state are used 
to create economic opportunities for black advancement (Greenberg, 2003, p.1 0-11). 
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Later policy documents and statutory laws drafted by the new government, including 
the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme and the 1997 White Paper on 
South African Land Policy, further committed the government to redistribute 30 
percent of Agricultural land and complete the adjudication process on land restitution 
claims in the first five years of South Africa's democracy (1994-1999), and to a land 
reform programme that would address, "the injustices of racially- based land 
dispossession of the past; the need for land reform to reduce poverty and contribute to 
economic growth; security of tenure for all; and a system of land management which 
will support sustainable land use patterns and rapid land release for development", 
respectively (Thwala, 2003, p.11). The 1997 White Paper on Land Policy merely 
consolidated the existing approaches to land reform. It identified the challenge as 
' find[ing] a way of redistributing land to the needy, and at the same time maintaining 
public confidence in the land market' (Department of Land Affairs (DLA), 1997, 
p.17). The government would provide a small subsidy to assist beneficiaries in the 
purchase of land through the market. At the same time, the government would serve 
as a facilitator only, not as a driver of the programme. 
1.5 THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE LAND REFORM 
PROGRAMME IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Ben Cousins (1999, cited in Capps and Batterbury, 2000) presented an insightful 
analysis of the land question in South Africa, stressing the networks of ~ctors and 
their preoccupations that had created a complex set of policy changes, reversals, and 
conflicts in recent years prior to 1999. South Africa has a set of broad political 
interests in the state, and in society as a whole. It has networks of actors (policy 
experts, state employees, advisors) who create policy 'discourses' about land. 
Political interests in the state include: The Presidency and Cabinet, Government 
Departments; old white bureaucrats and new black bureaucrats; provincial 
government and local government bodies. In society at large, there are differentiated 
rural communities, constituencies of farm workers who often live on private farms, a 
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set of emerging black entrepreneurs, white commercial farmers, traditional leaders, 
and a variety of corporate capitalist interests and foreign investors. There are linkages 
between many organisations in society at large. 
Actor networks formed since 1990 have included the NLC (National Land 
Commission), the ANC's Land Commission (LAPC) which was itself advised by the 
World Bank, and university economists. The conjunction of these three bodies led to 
the formulation of the RDP and land reform policy. Implementation initially fell to the 
ministers of land affairs and agriculture being Derek Hanekom and Doctor A.I. van 
Niekerk respectively. Under their supervision, government policy had essentially 
fallen into three policy arms: (1) rights-based legislation and programmes; (2) 
market-assisted redistribution via a R16 000 grant; and (3) the promotion of small-
scale farming. Cousins' framework for understanding the outcome of these three 







'Cousins' framework for understanding the outcome of the three 
different policy discourses in South Mrica 
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and support commmunal Promote efficient 
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Enhance agricultural Target rural 
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(outsourcing) 
Land -----. Tradition ----+ African leadership 
Source: Cousins, 1999, cited in Capps and Batterbury, 2000. 
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Policy shifts in 1999-2000 have resulted in some elements of this wider South 
African discourse proving more powerful than others. In 1999 and 2000, the terms of 
debate and the direction of policy have shifted markedly, with new directives and 
personnel. From the Non-Governmental Organisation's (NGO's) side, there has been 
criticism that the projected restitution ofland has been too slow, that redistribution 
has been badly planned, that there is a lack of political will behind these measures, 
and that there is a gender bias against women in the way land reform has been 
handled. From both internal critics in the DLA and in the Department of Agriculture, 
came the criticism that the DLA leadership was too 'white' and potentially racist. 
It was the combination of these two critical thrusts that resulted in Thoko Didiza 
taking up office as the head of the DLA in 1999. Her initial response was to: 
• Design a 'black commercial farmers programme'. 
• To declare an intention to 'transfer lands to tribes', where customary law will 
apply. 
• To go about restitution using cash payouts. 
• To support black leadership in government Departments. 
• To initiate, in September 2000, an integrated rural development programme, 
possibly with links to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(F AO), and with unknown operational components (Capps and Batterbury, 
2000). 
The current initiatives of the DLA and the more recent political debates around policy 
measures will be comprehensively discussed further in Chapter 4. 
1.6 POVERTY AND LAND NEED IN SOUTH AFRICA 
As discussed earlier, South African history can be seen in terms of a continual process 
of land dispossession. A legacy of insecurity, landlessness and poverty amongst black 
people and inefficient land use and administration was created (Surplus People's 
Project, 1983, p.156). Since the Native Land Act, 27 of 1913, the right to own rent or 
sharecrop land in South Africa depended upon racial classification. Millions of black 
people were compelled to leave their ancestral and privately owned lands and resettle 
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in overcrowded and environmentally degraded reserves. These areas became known 
as separate development entities or 'bantustans'. These inequalities created a difficult 
legacy for post - apartheid reconstruction and development, particularly in the rural 
areas (Drimie, 2000, p.2). 
For example, the 1998 Poverty and Inequality Report indicated that 50 percent of the 
national population were defined as poor using a South African poverty line 
equivalent to R15 (about US Dollars 2,40) per person per day (Office of the Deputy 
President, 1998). Poverty extends beyond insufficient income and includes access to 
essential services and the marginalisation of certain people (May and Vaughan, 1999, 
p.69). Most poverty occurs in rural areas as is given in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: Distribution of poor individuals by rural/urban classification 
Population share Poverty share Poverty rate 
percentage percentage percentage 
Rural 50.4 71.6 70.9 
Urban 49.6 28.4 28.5 
All 100 100 49.9 
Source: May, 2000, p.23. 
The poverty share of rural areas, which refers to the poorest percent of households in 
terms of consumption expenditure, was 71.6 percent. The poverty rate was 70.9 
percent in these areas compared to 28.5 in urban areas. Poverty was severest in the 
provinces that contained the former 'Bantustans', where lower cash incomes fell 
below the poverty line. Figure 1.1 (Next Page) shows the former 'bantustans' with the 
dark areas depicting the former 'independent' TBVC: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei and Self-Governing Territories such as Kwazulu. (May and 
Vaughan, 1999, Drimie, 2000, p.3) 
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Figure 1.1: Republic of South Africa - former 'bantustans' 
.. f l.JT"... ....,.. " .... ' 
\ 
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Source: Mokgope, 2000, p.113. 
A study conducted by the Land and Agricultural Policy Centre (LAPC) in 1996 
attempted to provide an estimate of actual land demand for agricultural production 
(Marcus et aI, 1996, p.17). The figure in Table 1.4 (Next Page) indicates a broad 
demand as two-thirds of rural households desired agricultural land either to 
supplement what they already had or because they had none at all. The study also 
showed that this rural demand was limited as almost 50 percent of respondents 
reported wanting one hectare or less, 45 percent reported wanting between one hectare 
and ten hectares, and only five percent considered that they would need more than ten 
hectares (Deininger et ai, 1999, p.15). 
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Table 1.4: The demand for land in South Africa 
Province No. of Mean household Percentage 
households size householders who 
(millions) need land 
1. Eastern Cape 1.106 5.3 70.3% 
2. Free State 0.618 4.0 50.0% 
3. Gauteng 1.887 3.8 76.0% 
4. Kwazulu-Natal 1.237 6.2 78.3% 
5. Mpumalanga 0.563 4.7 68.0% 
6. Northern Cape 0.213 3.5 40.0% 
7.Northern Province 0.764 5.4 72.4% 
8. North West 0.879 3.9 40.1% 
9. Western Cape 1.0956 3.9 74.5% 
National 7.887 4.8 67.7% 
Source: Department of land affairs, 1998 cited in Drimie, 2000, p.4. 
1. 7 CONCLUSION 
After gaining a solid understanding of the concept of land reform and related issues, 
the great demand for land in South Africa, and the historical and political basis for 
land reform in South Africa, it would now be appropriate to examine the types of land 
reform processes with relevant international examples, which are covered in the next 
chapter. This is done to create a strong framework of understanding, which is essential 
when the focus is shifted directly onto the economic rationale for land reform in South 
Africa and South African land reform experience in the latter chapters (Chapters 3 
and 4). 
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CHAPTER 2 - OBJECTIVES, TYPES OF LAND REFORM AND LESSONS 
LEARNED WITH RELEV ANT EXAMPLES 
2.1 GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF LAND REFORM 
Agricultural and rural development that benefits the masses of people can succeed 
only through a joint effort by the government and all farmers. A first step in any such 
effort is the provision of secured tenure rights to the individual farmer. It is for this 
reason as well as for reasons of higher agricultural output and the simultaneous 
achievement of both greater efficiency and equity that land reform is often proposed 
as a necessary first condition for agricultural development in less developed countries 
(LDC's). In most countries, the highly unequal structure ofland ownership is 
probably the single most important determinant of the existing highly inequitable 
distribution of rural income and wealth (Todaro, 2003, p. 452). 
Different countries may have different objectives for land reform. While the 
objectives may be inter-related and complementary, sometimes achieving one 
objective retards or conflicts with another. The principal conflict usually lies between 
achieving social equity, while striving for economic and efficient utilization of land 
and other resources. Dividing expropriated large farms into numerous small plots may 
result in decreased household food production, marketable surpluses and export 
earnings for the government. On the contrary, if a government does not implement a 
land reform programme, it may fail to raise the standard ofliving of many of its 
people and in the long run create political instability (Zinyama, 1999, p.9). 
One or more of three motives governs the majority of land reform programmes around 
the world: Political, Social and Economic (Hirsch, 1972; King, 1971 cited in 
Zinyama, 1999, p.10). The political motive is usually underpinned in government 
statements on reform; nevertheless it is often a chief factor in appealing to the landless 
peasantry or dis empowering landowners perceived as a threat to the ruling class. The 
social equity motive is in most cases closely linked to the political motive hence the 
government promises to give land to the landless peasants in return for political 
support. The economic motive on its own rests on the premise that land reform will 
r 
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result in greater agricultural production, increased marketable surpluses for domestic 
consumption and I or export, and higher rural household incomes. 
As stated earlier, each country or region has its own specific objectives but following 
objectives as provided by the SEAMEO Secretariat (2000), the land reform authority 
in Thailand provides an excellent general framework: " 
1) To convert tenant and landless farmers into owner-operators; 
2) To provide and ownership to squatter farmers through legalisation and land 
distribution; 
3) To increase agricultural production and improve delivery systems of 
supporting services so as to ensure betterment of living standards among the 
farmers; and 
4) To reduce social and economic inequalities among the populace." 
The White Paper on South African Land Policy was published in its final form in 
April 1997. It grew out of an extensive process of popular consultation, including a 
National Land Policy Conference in late 1995, and departmental engagement with 
submissions and comment on earlier drafts of its proposals. It identified the following 
as the key issues for land reform to address: 
• The injustices of racially based legislation; 
• The inequitable distribution ofland; 
• The need for security of tenure for all; 
• The need for sustainable use of land; 
• The need for rapid release of land for development; 
• The need to record and register all rights in property; and 
• The need to administer public land in an effective manner (DLA, 1997). 
These were summarized by Walker (2002, p.39) into a four-fold case for land reform: 
• To redress the injustices of apartheid; 
• To foster national reconciliation and stability; 
• To underpin economic growth; and 
• To improve household welfare and alleviate poverty. 
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"Land reform" is used to refer to a number of rather distinct processes or programmes. 
In the list below the broad spectrum is divided into types. These processes are not at 
all mutually exclusive. Many states have two or more of these types of land reform as 
part of their rural development "package" of programmes. 
i 
2.2 IMPOSED REDISTRIBUTIVE REFORMS 
In a redistributive land reform, the land is taken from large holders and given to 
landless and poor farmers. This normally includes nationalisation: redistribution 
policies involving expropriation of land on grounds of excessive size, under 
utilisation, ownership by absentee landlords and or foreigners. This type of land 
reform often grows out of a post crisis situation such as a war or civil war. The police 
power of the state is used to redefine the property rights of landholders. Thus, such a 
land reform requires an exclusive control on political power. It can succeed only 
where the power of the existing rural, land-based elite is either transferred or 
eliminated. Therefore, such land reforms have been often directed more by ideological 
fervour than sound technical planning. It is interesting to note that this category 
represents both the most successful and the most unsuccessful examples of land and 
agrarian reform. The failures to emulate elsewhere the successes in Asia of Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan probably led to the general disenchantment with land 
reform among the donor community. Several of the major multilateral donors such as 
the World Bank and the European Union have adopted governing rules that require 
them to refrain from lending for land purchases (Riddel et aI, 2000). 
REGIONAL EXAMPLES OF REDISTRIBUTIVE LAND REFORM: ASIA, 
LATIN AMERICA, NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND SOVIET AND 
FORMER COMMAND ECONOMIES 
Asia: Japan probably represents the archetypical representation of a successful land 
reform. Implementation was enforced by the United States occupation forces 
following World War Two as a means of breaking the power of the large landowners 
who had strongly led the militaristic developments in Japan in the pre- war period. 
Land holding ceilings were established at one hectare. The landlords were 
compensated in a combination of cash and development bonds. The rural producer 
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populations largely stayed on their previous holding, but were now given full 
ownership rights and a highly subsidised mortgage. Key factors that are often 
overlooked in the literature, but are critical to understanding the success or failure of 
other land reforms were the existing well developed extension service, land records 
and efficient bureaucracy (Yang, 1970 cited in Riddel et aI, 2000). 
Latin America has been a region that has had its fair share of land reform 
programmes. Starting with the Mexican revolution of 1910 there had been a series of 
attempts to impose a land reform in the region (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, EI 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru). While there has been much justified 
criticism of these reforms, they did benefit many thousands of poor rural families and 
did receive wide support in the society at large. They did not, however, result in the 
kind of transformation envisaged in the original design. Cuba is the sole exception. 
The programmes were universally under-funded so that needed services, inputs, and 
institutional development could not take place, or took place too late. Finally, they 
were bureaucratically top heavy and did not build on or create a self sustaining 
farming system (Thiesenhusen, 1995). 
The Near East and North African Region also saw the attempts at major land reforms. 
Egypt, North Africa, Iraq and Iran all undertook major land reform projects in the 
period from 1950 to the mid 1970s. Again, though the literature emphasises the 
failures, there is no denying that again, as in Latin America, the benefits reached 
many thousands of impoverished rural families. Egypt was by far the most thorough 
going and benefited the most people. (El-Ghonemy, 1993) 
Finally, one should mention all of the land and agrarian reforms inspired by the Soviet 
model of command economies: the entire agrarian reform policy of China, the former 
Soviet Union and other command economies (Angola, Cuba, Eastern and Central 
Europe, Ethiopia and Mozambique) was predicated on a concept of social, as opposed 
to individual, property rights in rural resources. We have to remember that it was the 
promise of an agrarian reform that led to much grassroots support for these 
governments in the initial period. Today the emphasis in all these countries is to 
reverse this process (Riddel et aI, 2000). 
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2.3 LAND TENURE REFORM 
This type of reform is used in all other categories, but is often used as the main 
instrument of achieving both more efficient and equitable distribution of land and 
resources, for example, water. The focus is on techniques and institution-rebuilding 
that make land tenure institutions work in a more efficient, effective and fair way. 
Thus, the focus is on the social, political, and economic support needed for 
institutionalised transactions in rights in property. The fundamentals of this approach 
are good legal support and effective land information systems (LIS). It has been 
repeatedly observed that where the cadastre, which is a public register of the quantity, 
value and ownership of the real property of a region or country, and land registry is 
poorly maintained or non-existent, there are high costs for proper survey, valuation 
and creation of new land records. The transaction costs for property exchange often 
exceed the economic value of the property involved. Experience has shown that 
landowners have many tools available to frustrate the process of creating fair and 
open economic transactions. 
Land tenure reform is usually based on the creation of unambiguous property rights in 
land through legal reform and land registration. First, the newly established private 
rights must be clear. Second, "private" refers largely to control, that is, legal capacity: 
private tenure imbues the owner with control over the acquisition, use, enjoyment and 
disposal of the property. These rights are conditioned by the context - specific statutes 
and laws that limit the absolute freedom of an individual through restrictions on land 
use (Riddel et aI, 2000). 
EXAMPLES OF LAND TENURE REFORM: MEXICO AND THAILAND 
Mexico and Thailand represent two of the world's most ambitious attempts to 
stimulate rural development through land tenure reform. In 1992, Mexico initiated a 
process to remove the restrictions on land market transactions on the social property 
ofthe 'Ejido' communities that had been created out of the redistributive land reform 
of 1910 - 1936. The process has involved a massive land demarcation. Since this 
extensive experiment is too recent to make any final judgement at this time, an 
examination ofthe case in Thailand may be illustrative (De Janvry et aI, 1997). 
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Thailand is in its thirteenth year of a 20-year programme to provide modem cadastre, 
land registration and land conveyancing and credit institutions to all its rural 
populations. It is estimated that over 20 million properties so far have been registered. 
A recently completed monitoring and evaluation project by Thai research centres has 
revealed that rural incomes, major investments like tractors, land transactions, land 
improvement, use of formal credit is much higher among farmers with titled land than 
for those yet to be included in the programme. The data also indicates that the land 
tenure regularisation has stimulated the emergence of strong private credit and supply 
/ marketing participation. Non- registered rural populations also benefit (Riddel et aI, 
2000). 
2.4 MARKET-LED REFORM 
This is a type of land reform that combines very naturally with the realisation that 
when they work properly, markets are the best arbiter of supply and demand of goods 
and services. If this is the case, why could we not get land markets to function in a 
way that those who really want to farm and are the best farmers would get land, and 
inefficient land holders and absentee land owners would be driven out by market 
forces? This usually involves direct government intervention in the market by making 
assets available to those too disadvantaged to enter into normal land market 
transactions. This includes the distribution of public lands; state expenditure on land 
reclamation and subsequent allotment as private property; mortgage interest tax relief; 
support to institutions to administer the necessary land acquisition and distribution 
mechanisms and to advice services to prospective landowners. 
A land market always requires some state intervention. A land market by itself will 
not do much to transfer land to the poor who want to be independent, land owning 
producers. This is because where the former owner has to be compensated at market 
or near market value by the purchaser, a poor farmer cannot repay out of farm profits 
alone. Land always contains a premium value over and above the value of its 
agricultural productivity due to its collateral value in a market economy and 
preferential access to credit. It has been the unfortunate observation that where the 
market is not sufficiently monitored after distribution, land distribution is quickly 
followed by land return to the former owners. It goes without saying that a market-led 
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land refonn requires an active land market. That is, there have to exist willing-sellers 
and buyers (Riddel et aI, 2000). 
EXAMPLES OF MARKET-LED REFORM: COLOMBIA AND BRAZIL 
WITH A COMPARISON 
In Colombia, maldistribution of land in rural areas, while dating back to the Spanish 
conquest, has been reinforced and exacerbated in more recent times by a number of 
factors, induding (i) tax incentives for agriculture that implied that rich individuals 
acquired land in order to offset taxes on non-agricultural enterprises; (ii) legal 
impediments to the smooth functioning of the land rental and sales markets such as 
the prohibition of share tenancy; (iii) credit and interest rate subsidies providing 
incentives for mechanized agricultural cultivation with low labour intensity. 
The main reasons for the shift from an interventionist to a market-assisted model of 
land refonn were the limited success of centralized land refonn and the elimination of 
the traditional source of finance for INCORA (a duty on imports). Even though 
considerable amounts of resources were spent on land refonn (INCORA's average 
annual budget in the 1980s was about US$140 million), almost 35 years of operations 
had produced little visible effect. In the early 1990's the administrative costs of 
transferring land were very high, amounting to about 50 percent of the total land 
refonn budget or about US $15 000 per beneficiary. Many beneficiaries of the 
INCORA programme abandoned full-time agriculture and rented out most or all of 
their land, in many cases to the old landlord. Despite almost 35 years of state-led land 
refonn the Gini coefficient of the operational land distribution fell by only 3 
percentage points, from 0.87 to 0.84 (Deininger and Olinto, 1998). 
With a land distribution among the most unequal in the world, Brazil's situation is 
similar to Colombia's in a number of respects. There is a very large and vocal 
political demand for land refonn; a recent F AO study estimates the number of 
families who are potential candidates for land refonn at 2.5 million. A land refonn 
institute (INCRA) was established in 1969, distributing 10 million hectares to 200 000 
families and colonizing about 14 million hectares for about 75 000 beneficiary 
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families since then. Land reform has acquired political importance; a federal Minister 
for Agrarian Reform was appointed in 1996 and the land reform budget tripled from 
US $0.4 billion in 1994 to $1.3 billion in 1995; a further increase to $2.6 billion is 
proposed. Rather than relying on a lengthy process of expropriation, land is selected 
by community-groups on a willing seller-willing buyer basis. This is expected to 
reduce the price of land from currently US$ll 000 to $3 000, mainly by avoiding the 
need to pay for expensive land improvements that are of little use for small-scale 
agriculture. Instead of compensating landlords with highly discounted government 
bonds, they are paid cash. This provides a strong incentive for landowners including 
many banks who hold title to large tracts of land as a collateral for non-performing 
loans to sell land to land reform beneficiaries. Government's role is reduced to 
providing assurance that there are no problems with the land titles, and ensuring that 
the price negotiated between community groups and landlords is within acceptable 
boundaries. Projects are approved at the state level. Technical assistance is provided 
on a strictly demand driven basis; beneficiaries can use part of the community grant 
made available under a World Bank loan to contract private providers; CONT AG 
(Federation of Rural Workers) participates in the state councils and assists with 
information dissemination and land purchase negotiations. The only commonality 
between pilots and the nation-wide land reform process is the fact that beneficiaries 
under the new process have access to a subsidized loan under a special programme 
(PROCERA) for land reform beneficiaries (Deininger and Olinto, 1998) 
While the broad principles are similar to those in Colombia, the process is 
considerably more flexible and agile. The main points of difference are the following: 
Since grant financing is provided for complementary and community-level 
infrastructure rather than land itself, beneficiaries have an incentive to reduce the 
price for land as much as possible. This would focus land reform on lands that are 
currently under utilized, where the social gains from the intervention are maximized. 
The process of beneficiary selection is less formal and bureaucratic than in Colombia 
and relies more on existing community associations. Since the working capital credit 
provided to beneficiaries is subsidized (with a subsidy element of70 percent), other 
sources of working capital, as well as marketing channels, need to be available to 
ensure the long term economic viability of land reform beneficiaries. This may well 
be one of the most critical aspects ofland reform. 
23 
Given the political importance of land reform and the limited knowledge of both the 
most appropriate mechanisms to implement this reform as well as the magnitude of 
the productivity and poverty-impact, the government has established an Institute for 
Agrarian Studies to encourage discussion between all parts of civil society on land 
reform issues; monitor the implementation of the process and make the data collected 
publicly available (Deininger and Olinto, 1998). 
2.5 LAND REFORM THROUGH RESTITUTION 
The focus in this case is on the restoration of rights, which are felt to have been 
unjustly taken. This process is technically a legal and judicial process that returns 
rights to a pre-<ietermined date or year. In most of Eastern and Central Europe this 
year is 1948, in South Africa it is 1913. 
EXAMPLES OF LAND REFORM THROUGH RESTITUTION: EASTERN 
AND CENTRAL EUROPE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
While land restitution is a form of land reform to address past injustices, in both 
Eastern and Central Europe and in South Africa it is running into a number of 
practical problems. The principal one is that the entire physical infrastructure has 
changed dramatically since the rights to individual parcels were unjustly acquired. 
Citizens, quite understandably, insist on the return of their original property, but this 
nowadays is usually at odds with access, service provisions or even sound sustainable 
land use. Where original properties have been restituted, the general experience has 
been one of disappointment and limited economic utility. This will be expected to 
change through innovations in the land tenure reform that will allow equitable 
property rationalisation by the resettled owners (Letsoalo, 1996). 
2.6 FAO'S LESSONS LEARNED ON LAND REFORM FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
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After examining the types of land reform processes, it is important to determine the 
key lessons before moving onto the future challenges. In this regard, Maximiliano 
Cox and his research team from the F AO Rural Development Division (2003, p.2l-
23) conducted a comprehensive review of land reform experiences throughout the 
world from the early 1940's to the present period in time. The following is summary 
of the salient lessons learned from their widespread study. 
Lesson 1: Good governance and the rule of law correlate closely with the 
successful implementation of the process. 
Measures to reduce the inherent instability and uncertainty that accompany profound 
social change should be enacted decisively. Social mobilization, which is necessary to 
maintain the momentum and political support of such changes, should be kept within 
rational limits. This was achieved in the 1964-70 Chilean experience, as well as in 
Mexico and the Philippines. Moreover, good governance and effective state apparatus 
are required for successful implementation. To a large extent, the reforms in Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China were successful because of the 
conjunction of these positive factors: good governance; reliance on existing 
managerial abilities of the land reform beneficiaries; and profiting from expanding 
market opportunities caused by general economic growth, increased demand for 
agricultural products and guaranteed good output prices. Among the most important 
of these were political will and good governance that is, limited corruption and rent-
seeking behaviour in the implementation of the reforms. 
Lesson 2: Non-biased macroeconomic policies are crucial to the successful 
implementation of land reform. 
As with any process requiring growth in agriculture, the overall macroeconomic 
conditions, especially those affecting interest and exchange rates and including 
promotional policies for agricultural production are essential for the success of the 
land reform process. 
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Lesson 3: Land redistribution needs to be coupled with the provision of support 
services for beneficiaries, including targeted access to capital, services and 
markets. 
The major redistributive reforms in Latin America tended to have an initial positive 
impact. However, a lack of support services for beneficiaries and unfavourable 
macroeconomic factors subsequently hampered the performance of the reformed 
sector severely. The provision of these services is critical, especially where dealing 
with beneficiaries with low entrepreneurial experience. 
Lesson 4: The previous managerial experience of land reform beneficiaries is 
essential. 
The land reform programmes in Egypt, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan 
Province of China and several states in India enabled tenants to become owners of the 
land they cultivated. In part, these reforms were successful because of the continued 
use of existing physical infrastructure, including road network and irrigation facilities 
and institutional infrastructure, as previously existing input supply, credit and 
marketing structures were not disrupted. An additional advantage was the availability 
of trained human resources. 
Lesson 5: A rational system of individual economic incentives in the reformed 
sector is critical. 
The introduction of individual economic incentives can generate a highly dynamic 
response. China introduced such mechanisms under the household responsibility 
system in 1978, which gave farming families usufruct rights over cultivated land. At 
the same time, the organizational system of the People's Communes, which had 
proved to be low efficiency were abolished. The results of the reform have been 
impressive. After 30 years of stagnation, growth in agricultural output in the first half 
ofthe 1980's accelerated to a rate several times the previous long-term average. Most 
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of the increase is attributed to the strong incentives given by the reforms to individual 
farmers coupled with the partial liberalization of the produce market. 
Lesson 6: Fair compensation packages for landowners, that is, fully 
compensating for reinvestment and providing for some real liquidity to reduce 
the potential negative impacts on economic growth. 
Payments for expropriated land that are viewed as confiscatory can generate violent 
reactions and will affect production and the overall economy substantially during the 
initial phases ofland reform. In Chile the reforms of the 1960's provided cash 
compensation for improvements, thus enabling investment in agriculture to increase 
during this period. The land reforms in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
Province of China compensated former landholders with cash and development 
bonds, which encouraged investment of the proceeds in industry. 
Lesson 7: Social capital formation is important, through the participation of 
local communities and beneficiaries in taking control of their own development. 
The Philippines started its land reforms in 1964 and local communities have played an 
increasingly large role as these reforms have progressed. A broad-based peasant 
lobby pressured Congress and the President to enact the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Programme in 1988. In the early 1990's, the Department of Agrarian Reform 
recognised that effective alliances with autonomous peasant organisations were 
essential to the implementation of land reform. Farmers' groups are now engaged in 
facilitating the provision of support services to land reform communities. 
Lesson 8: Appropriate land administration capacity is crucial to land reform 
implementation. 
Land Administration is a critical tool for enabling the implementation of land reforms, 
particularly through land surveying, titling and registration, but also through land-use 
planning, land valuation and land taxation. Land titling is frequently a costly process, 
but it generates major economic advantages by securing land rights and providing 
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investment incentives. The need to give due attention to the interests of the poor and 
underprivileged, particularly women and indigenous peoples, has been recognized as 
they have lost out in some titling projects (Cox et aI, 2003, p.23). 
The fact that in many countries the current land ownership distribution has its origins 
in discriminatory policies rather than in market forces has long provided a 
justification for adopting policies aimed at land reform. The record of such policies is 
mixed. Land reforms have been very successful in Asia (Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan), and positive impacts have been reported from some African countries such 
as Kenya and Zimbabwe in the early phases of their post independence land refomls. 
At the same time, land reforms in Latin America, other Asian countries, and more 
recently South Africa, failed to live up to their objectives and remain incomplete in 
many respects. A key reason for such limited impact was that reforms were often 
guided by short-term political objectives, or that implementation responded more to 
planners ' conceptions than to the needs of beneficiaries, often limiting the reforms' 
sustainability and their impact on poverty. 
Where extreme inequality in land distribution and underutilization of vast tracts of 
productive land co- exist with deep rural poverty, a case for redistributive measures to 
increase access to land by the poor can be made, both politically and from an 
economic perspective. Even in such cases, a number of different instruments (ranging 
from expropriation with compensation to activation of rental markets) to effect the 
transfer of land will normally be available. To ensure success of the reform and 
productive use of the land, land reform needs to be combined with other programmes 
at the governnlent's disposal. Access to non-land assets and working capital and a 
conducive policy environment are essential. Those benefiting from land reform need 
to be able to access output markets as well as credit, the selection of beneficiaries 
needs to be transparent and participatory, and attention needs to be paid to the fiscal 
viability of land reform efforts (Deininger, 2003, p. xl). 
2.7 CHRISTIANSEN'S LESSONS LEARNED ON REDISTRIBUTIVE 
LAND REFORM FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
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In order to assess the perfonnance of the land refonn programme in South Africa 
(covered in detail in Chapter 4) it is necessary to reflect on the International 
experience with redistributive land refonn. The five salient lessons to emerge from the 
international experiences in redistributive land refonn are summarised by Christiansen 
(1996, p.365-366) as follows: 
• The speed of implementation of the programme. In the absence of fast 
paced programmes, a combination of excessive bureaucracy, over-
centralisation of the process and legal challenges are likely to render the 
programme ineffective. Success is strongly influenced by rapid 
implementation. 
• Economic viability of the farm models. There must be a careful assessment 
of the models or livelihood options available to rural households before a 
refonn programme is implemented. The models should indicate whether the 
persons resettled on the land have sufficient land- size and quality to provide at 
least the target income. Furthennore, in computing the costs and benefits, 
other assistance and infrastructure necessary to generate the target income 
should be included. 
• Political acceptability and legitimacy of the programme. A consensus 
across the spectrum of political opinion that the programme is both necessary 
and the most acceptable way of achieving the stated goals, must be reached. 
Land refonn programmes are not irreversible, particularly where this 
consensus has not been achieved. 
• Clear definition of the role that public sector can and will play. The 
proposed programme must be evaluated in light of an understanding of the 
roles that the public sector can and must play, and what should be best left to 
the non- governmental sector. Programmes that have relied entirely on the 
public sector in the belief that is the only one capable of maintaining integrity, 
delivering services, detennining needs and managing the process have been 
failures . 
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• Land reform is only one part of a comprehensive programme of economic 
reconstruction. The redistribution of land is necessary, but not sufficient to 
guarantee the success of a development programme. There is the need for 
additional services such as infrastructure, markets, incentives and health to be 
considered and access provided. These considerations are necessary both to 
sustain higher productivity subsequent to reform and to include others who 
may not benefit from the direct provision of land. 
It is in the light of these lessons that it is generally accepted that market-assisted land 
redistribution programmes tend to perform better than those administered and 
operated by the public sector. The need for reliance on market mechanisms stems 
from the observed weaknesses of non-market orientated programmes that typically 
vest too much control in public sector bureaucracies (Kirsten and Van Zyl, 1999, 
p.328). 
2.8 LAND REFORM DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
The reduction of poverty and inequality of land redistribution, associated with 
sustained agricultural output growth, have been the common concern of the 
international community since the 1960's. Two leading economists of the World Bank 
have recently examined these important quantified rural development issues of 
inequality, poverty and growth, and their relationships to one another (Deininger and 
Squire, 1998 cited in EI-Ghonemy, 2003, p.40). Their aim was to explore why several 
countries have failed both to increase their economic growth rates and to reduce their 
poverty levels after their implementation of economic reform programmes. Their 
results indicate a n,egative effect ofland inequality on subsequent income growth. The 
inequality hurts the rural poor through two channels: (1) the inability to provide 
cOllateral ,rb'orrOWing agricultural credit, and (2) the low schooling attainment 
resultingin high illiteracy. 
/' 
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Empirical evidence also suggests that land distribution inequality increased: in the 
1980's and 1990's in sub-Saharan Africa; in East European countries where land 
reforms were dismantled after the collapse of the Soviet Union; and in the 1970's and 
1980's in South Asia. This increased inequality has affected growth negatively. The 
conclusion of these studies is that a combination of increased aggregate investment 
and land redistribution for the benefit of the poor raises their incomes significantly, 
and is an effective way of reducing poverty and increasing economic growth. 
The great challenge is to cope with the rising demand for access to land as represented 
by the increasing numbers oflandless wage-dependent workers, in particular, and the 
agricultural workforce in general. This trend is compounded by another alarming 
trend of increasing concentration of land. At the same time, the aggregate supply of 
land of cultivable land is diminishing. Moreover, the employment opportunities for 
the growing numbers of agricultural workers have narrowed. This is primarily as a 
result of rising unemployment in urban areas combined with the replacement of 
unskilled rural workers by more skilled and educated job-seekers competing for low-
paid jobs, in addition to labour-displacing technology induced by free-trade 
globalisation (El-Ghonemy, 2003, pAO) 
In conclusion, one could ask how developing countries' governments can meet these 
challenges if the present trends continue into the twenty-first century, as their ability 
to address them directly has been restricted and their role in development redefined by 
neo-liberalism, as reflected in conditionalities of price stabilization and foreign debt 
recovery agreements. Their response is made even more challenging by the fear of 
being disadvantaged in terms of world trade competitiveness, including their efforts to 
attract much needed foreign capital. The next two decades will be a testing time for 
governments seeking to address this dilemma. A failure to do so will increase the risk 
of social unrest and political instability (EI-Ghonemy, 2003, pAl). 
It must be noted that governments are most likely to meet these challenges if they use 
the mechanisms at their disposal in concert and with the objective of maximizing 
synergies between them. This also implies a need to integrate land reform into the 
broader context of economic and social policies aimed at development and poverty 
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reduction, and to implement programmes in a decentralized way with maximum 
participation by potential beneficiaries and at least some grant element. Given the 
continuing relevance of the issue, the often heated political debate surrounding it, and 
the lack of quantitative evidence on some more recent approaches, rigorous, open, and 
participatory evaluation of ongoing experiences is particularly important (Deininger, 
2003, p. xl). 
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CHAPTER 3 - ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR LAND REFORM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
The main arguments favouring land reform in South Africa are primarily based on 
social equity and economic necessity. 
3.1 MARKET-LED LAND REFORM 
As explained earlier, the South African "negotiated settlement" (1990-1994), which 
led to the first democratic elections in 1994, and the subsequent adoption of the 
constitution in 1996, culminated in a market-led land reform policy. As a 
precondition for this, a programme of agriculturalliberalisation was adopted, that 
completed the eradication of Apartheid-era subsidisation schemes that benefited 
large-scale white commercial farmers. This programme was coupled with the 
removal of barriers to market entry, both domestically and for export with price 
incentives shifting towards high-value labour-intensive crops, the decline of land 
prices and the considerable increase in the supply of land on the market (Deininger et 
aI, 1999, p.4). This was in line with the government's growth, employment and 
redistribution plan (GEAR), which emphasised fiscal discipline, the importance of a 
'competitive outward orientated economy' and programme of 'accelerated tariff 
liberalisation' to guarantee a stable environment for confidence and a profitable surge 
in private investment (Department of Finance, 1996, p.1-5). These changes created 
the conditions for the land reform programme to utilise market transactions, rather 
than expropriation to transfer assets to the poor. 
A policy rethink regarding the approach to land reform during 1999 has led to 
changes in emphasis, which were claimed to speed up the redistribution of land. 
However, as noted by Cliffe (2000, p.272) the new formula is still couched in 
'modernist' orthodoxies, which still prevail in both the ANC and the South African 
Government. These are fixated on 'commercialisation'-which usually translates into 
larger-scale and sophisticated technologies and the promotion of the interests of a 
potential black agrarian entrepreneurial class, rather than satisfying the desperate 
needs of the landless in South Africa. 
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3.2 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SECURITY OF TENURE 
3.2.1 PROPERTY RIGHTS-ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
Land is a unique commodity; it is completely immobile, it can be put to different uses 
and used by various parties simultaneously. What governs the use of this resource is a 
system of property rights (PR's). Land property rights have some peculiar features; 
they van be very complex and they vary over space and time, requiring policymakers 
to adjust their instruments to the situation found in specific cases. PR's are so critical 
because their actual nature determines resource allocation in a world of conflicting 
user interests. As illustrated earlier (Table 1.1, p.5), there are four types of property 
regimes. All four types may be found in one society and more than one category may 
apply to the same tract ofland (Vogelgesang, 1998, p.24-25). 
The concepts of state and private property are fairly simple when compared with 
common property and open access. The distinguishing features between the latter two 
can be somewhat unclear in the sense that the incentive structure in a common 
property scenario may be such as to cause economic behaviour of individuals to 
resemble that under open access regimes. In many countries in Latin America, 
frequently up to 50 percent of cultivated land is untitled thus making it de facto open 
access. There is a belief that common property results inevitably in the degradation of 
the property because of the inability to control over-consumption by users that is 
described by the, "Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968). Based on this belief, 
advocates argue that only private property (or effective regulation) can work to 
protect the Commons. The failure to protect the Commons lies not in the form of 
property ownership, but in the inability to detect or exclude use. There are many 
societies where property is held in common which have been able to develop effective 
mechanisms to regulate use, and have been able to maintain sustainable resource use 
for centuries. 
According to Demsetz (1967, p.347), property rights "derive their significance from 
the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in 
his dealings with others." Demsetz also maintains that, "a primary function of 
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property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalisation of 
externalities." Based on Demsetz's two propositions it would appear that private 
property provides the best mechanism to internalise external effects and hence seem 
to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for economic development. This does 
imply that private PR's constitute the first-best solution in all circumstances. The 
most appropriate PR regime will depend on the individual conditions of a society, like 
its stage of economic development. 
Finally, PR's also play an integral role in providing incentives for efficient land use 
and investments in that they reduce asymmetric infonnation and thus facilitate 
transactions in financial markets. Asymmetric infonnation in land markets can emerge 
in the course of economic development of a society. In the initial stages, land 
transactions will greatly be carried out among members of the same community where 
infonnation is still mostly accurate and available. As the mobility of individuals and 
capital increases in the more advanced stages, an increasingly large number of 
transactions take place with outsiders resulting in problem of imperfect infonnation 
and land disputes. This could further result in an associated efficiency loss as the 
market price of land will move away from its shadow price and the extent of land 
transactions will be suboptimal (Vogelgesang, 1998, p.26-27). 
It should also be noted that although the optimal PR system may not always be the 
private PR system, in the process of economic development private property becomes 
ever more important. The economic history of European countries, for example, 
indicates that with growing development, as the division of labour increases, 
economic interaction between agents more complex, and factor slowly emerge, the 
institution of common ownership in land has to give way to private property regimes 
(Barlowe, 1958). 
3.2.2 SECURITY OF TENURE 
A central argument for strengthening land tenure has been the economic benefits 
deriving from such security. The nature and strength of property rights strongly 
conditions economic decision making because of their effects on people's 
expectations of a return on their investments of labour and capital. In neo-classical 
economic theory, property rights attempt to reduce the uncertainty that economic 
agents experience in terms of how other agents' actions may affect their own 
economic decisions. The importance of being able to transact property rights has 
increased in the African context with popUlation growth, specialisation and the 
incorporation of rural areas into market economies (Adams, 1999, p.4). 
3.2.3 LAND TENURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
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In the African context, customary land management has often been derided as 
obstructing development because of an inherent insecurity of land rights. Quan (1997) 
argues that customary tenure provides no incentives for land investment and no basis 
for credit or market allocations of land to the most efficient users. 
Customary land tenure systems, which are part of the broader social framework, often 
protect poor and vulnerable community members. Land has a social function as it is a 
common resource and has benefits and characteristics that entitle society to limit the 
absolute nature of the individual's ownership, the extent of such derogation being 
dependent on its locality (Marcus et aI, 1996, p.176). Indigenous law does not 
normally recognise individual ownership as land is regarded as a common socio-
economic asset, administered by the lawful authority in the form of a "chief', in 
consultation with a tribal council, for the benefit of the entire tribe or community. 
Customary land tenure in South Africa implies that persons may hold different, but 
concurrent rights in the same parcel of land, depending on their personal status within 
the group and on their personal needs (Letsoalo, 1991). Land rights are inextricably 
linked to, and reflect the social structure of, the land-holding community and centres 
on social relations and duties between persons in respect ofthings, rather than on 
production and land as economic resource (Cross, 1988). The tribal authority 
administers and allots vacant land by virtue of the fact that they rule the tribe. The 
recipient and their family have total control over the allotment in terms of use and 
occupation, rights which are normally granted for rest oftheir lives (Letsoalo, 1991). 
Adams et al (1999, p.3) divide most African landscapes with communal customary 
tenure into two broad categories: 
• The holding, which is land possessed and used relatively exclusively by 
individuals or households for residential, farming, or some other business 
activity; 
• The commons, which is land shared by multiple users for grazing and for 
gathering natural resources. 
The "holding" may form part of the "commons" when it is not being utilised. For 
example, in rural Kwazulu-Natal cattle are allowed to eat the crop residual after 
harvesting on arable holdings during the dry season grazing period (Drimie, 2000, 
p.37). 
3.3 REDISTRIBUTIVE LAND REFORM 
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Both politically and economically, the increased social equality and egalitarianism, 
which would result from redistributive land reform is highly desirable. This is in 
keeping with the fundamental objective of "social justice" after decades of injustice 
under Apartheid. The South African Land policy has largely focused on the equality 
of treatment for all land rights. In terms of the economic aspects, social justice is 
linked to issues of Employment, Income Distribution, Efficiency and the Size of the 
Domestic Market (Ellis, 1992, p.199). On the political side, social justice means 
increased social equality, which lies at the heart of the democratic transition in South 
Africa in terms of achieving true racial equality. 
3.3.1 EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY 
The main dilemma of the land reform programme in South Africa is the reconciliation 
of the historical claims of previously dispossessed black people and the need to 
maintain effective production of crops and livestock for sale to urban and rural 
consumers and export markets (Williams, 1996, p.148). The redistribution of land 
may be intended for the welfare benefit of poor people by improving their household 
food security. It may also be intended for production goals by fostering a rural 
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development path centred on efficient commercial agriculture. A reduction in land 
concentration needs to be balanced against relying on agricultural growth alone as an 
effective anti-poverty strategy (De Villiers and Critchley, 1997 cited in Drimie 2000, 
p.41 ). 
Neo-classical economic theory can shed some light on the meaning of equity and 
efficiency. Efficiency refers to making economic optimum use of a given set of 
national resources in order to achieve the highest level of material welfare for the 
consumers of a society as a whole, for a given set of prices in resource and output 
markets (Ellis, 1992, p.19). Growth can occur by moving from a less efficient to a 
more efficient use of existing resources, or by increasing the productivity of the given 
level of resources, so that more output can be obtained. Equity, on the other hand 
refers to the distribution of this total output amongst individuals or social groups 
within society. 
Quan (1997, p.9) has indicated that the relationship between economic growth and 
levels of inequality in land holdings in various developing countries reveals that a 
more equitable distribution of land is actually conducive to higher levels of growth. 
Hence, a reduction in the inequality of land ownership would increase the real 
incomes of rural households and the numbers that are able to obtain an acceptable 
livelihood from the land. Increasing the access to productive resources enhances 
people's ability to generate secure income by enabling the poor to produce food for 
the household and a potential surplus for the market. 
3.3.2 THE FARM-SIZE-EFFICIENCY RELATIONSHIP 
The concepts related to the fann- size-efficiency relationship have been defined in 
Ellis (1993, p.202-206), and tabled on the next page. 
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Table 3.1: Definition of terms- farm-size debate 
'Fann size' The area size offanns. 
'Scale offann enterprise' or 'fann scale' Differences in the overall economic size 
of fanns in relation to all the resources 
used in production. 
'Optimum fann size' The area size of fann, which minimises 
the long-run average unit cost of 
production for the given technology 
confronting all fanners. This will vary for 
different crops, different crop-specific 
technologies, relative factor prices such as 
land and labour and the balance between 
size-related cost economies and 
diseconomies. 
'Intensive cultivation' Small fann size with relatively large 
inputs of other resources 
'Extensive cultivation' Large fann size with low inputs of capital 
and labour. 
Source: Ellis, 1993, p. 202-206. 
Proponents of smaller fanns argue that there is an inverse relationship between fann-
size and productivity (Van Zyl, 1996, p.259). This argument is based on the theory of 
production relations which suggests that, with low levels of mechanisation, large 
fanns are in general less efficient than small fanns due to the problem of labour 
supervision. In other words, smaller fanns make a greater net contribution to output 
than a few large fanns, operating at the same level of technology (Drimie, 2000, 
p.43). 
Several empirical studies have shown that family labour is generally more productive 
than that of contracted agricultural workers (Biswanger et aI, 1993, p.4; Van Zyl et aI, 
1995). Smaller fanns theoretically select higher inputs of labour than large fanns and 
therefore produce higher levels of output from given inputs of land and capital. The 
higher labour input is due primarily to lower labour costs and the greater incentives 
fanners have to work effectively on their own lands. Large fanns are more dependent 
on hired labour with supervision and management costs to ensure quality of labour. 
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Smaller farms thus avoid transaction costs in the labour market. Furthermore, 
technological change in agriculture continually lowers the subsistence threshold size 
of holding while expanding options for small farmers (Conway, 1997 cited in Adams, 
1999, p.9). These arguments run contrary to the belief that agricultural production is 
subject to economies of scale in that large farms minimise capital transaction costs 
and fully utilise capital inputs. The existence of indivisible factors such as machinery, 
management knowledge or marketing underpins this argument (Bruce, 1993, p. 16 
cited in Drimie, 2000, p.44). 
Worldwide evidence of an inverse farm-size productivity relationship, as related to 
the rationale for land redistribution, is found in Domer (1992). The basic explanation 
is found in the differences in resource endowments, which lead small farms to allocate 
more labour per unit of land, thus cultivating the land more intensively than larger 
farms. According to Melmed-Sanjak and Lastarria-Cornhiel (1998, p.11) the works 
of Carter and Weibe (1990), Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) and Feder (1985), lay 
emphasis on the fact that land redistribution creates incentives for small farmers to 
cultivate intensively, resulting in land redistribution being a win-win process of 
efficiency and equity. 
According to Van Zyl (1996, p. 304) the inverse farm-size-efficiency relationship 
observed in South African commercial agriculture, does provide a strong argument for 
land reform. However, a precondition is the removal of all privileges to the farm 
sector because they tend to favour large farms over smaller ones, as well as the 
addressing of missing and imperfect markets for small farmers. Thus, the playing field 
should be levelled. 
3.3.3 DUALISTIC NATURE OF AGRICULTURE AND LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
The three most important features of South African agriculture are its dualistic 
structure (commercial and subsistence), the process of deregulation of commercial 
agriculture that has taken place over the past two decades, and the attempts to 
'deracialise' the sector since 1994. These features must be seen against the 
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background of the country's resource endowment. Of the 100.6 million hectares of 
agricultural land, only some 14 percent receives enough rainfall for arable farming, 
while the remainder is used for extensive grazing (83.9 million hectares), forestry and 
nature conservation. Only 1.35 million hectares of the arable land available is 
irrigated and yields at least a third of total agricultural output (Directorate; 
Agricultural Statistics, 2002 cited in Vink and Kirsten, 2003, p. 3). 
South African agriculture, like all other sectors of the economy, has a dual nature, 
with a well-developed commercial sector comprising about 50 000 commercial 
farmers occupying 86 % of agricultural land (Directorate; Agricultural Statistics, 
2002; NDA, 2001). Small-scale subsistence or communal farmers occupy the 
remaining 14 percent of farmland. Past government policies, which restricted blacks 
to specific regions called 'homelands' and therefore excluded them from entering 
mainstream agriculture, was a factor in promoting this dualistic nature of agriculture. 
The redistribution of farmland in South Africa is high on the government's agenda, 
and it generally accepted that it is necessary for political stability and hence economic 
growth (cited in Ortmann and Machethe, 2003, p. 48). 
3.4 THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE AND 
FARM WORKER EQUITY-SHARE SCHEMES 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) is a vast and relatively new multidisciplinary 
field that includes aspects of economics, history, sociology, political science, business 
organization and law. Oliver Williamson coined the phrase the "New Institutional 
Economics" (Coase, 2000) but it is commonly known that the New Institutional 
Economics emerged with Coase's 1937 article "The Nature of the Firm". This article 
and his other famous essay "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) started what many, 
including North (2000 cited in Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001 , p. 1) considered to be a 
revolution in economics. This new direction of economics considers that the cost of 
transacting, determined by institutions and institutional arrangements is the key to 
economic performance. It is therefore argued that the institutions of a country such as 
its legal, political, and social systems-determine its economic performance, and it is 
this, according to Coase (2000), that gives the new institutional economics its 
importance for economists. 
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The NIB acknowledges the important role of institutions, but argues that one can 
analyze institutions within the framework ofneoc1assical economics. In other words, 
under NIE, some of the unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical economics such as 
perfect information, zero transaction costs, full rationality are relaxed, but the 
assumption of self-seeking individuals attempting to maximise an objective function 
subject to constraints still holds. Furthermore, institutions are incorporated as an 
additional constraint under the NIE framework (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001, p. 2). 
The discussion that follows integrates Farm worker Equity-Share Schemes (FWES's) 
as a viable economic option for successful land reform in South Africa. As will be 
explained, FWES's have a strong NIE underpinning and assist in reducing and, in the 
long term, eliminating four common problems which arise in the land reform process; 
(1) The free-rider problem, (2) The horizon problem, (3) The portfolio problem and 
(4) The control problem. The actual performance of equity-sharing schemes in the 
South African Land reform context is covered in Section 4.2.3.3, p.55. 
FWES's were initiated in the Western Cape region of South Africa in the early 1990's 
as a method of redistributing farm assets to land reform beneficiaries while 
maintaining the viability of commercial farming operations. In a study of nine land 
reform projects, undertaken in the Western Cape during November 2001, Knight et al 
(2003, p. 228) identified the institutional characteristics of successful FWES's using 
relevant principles from the theory ofNIE and proposed a set of "best institutional 
practices" that is likely to promote the success of these and future projects and so 
enhance the contribution to land reform in South Africa. 
Knight et al (2003, p. 230) argue that equity- sharing schemes offer an institutional 
environment that creates an incentive to invest in enterprises where resources such as 
land are co-owned. Greene and Lyne (2001) substantiate this argument with the 
following reason. The majority of land currently being farmed by the state is 
contested by neighbouring communities. The notion that this land should be 
subdivided and privati sed to individuals who benefit from Land Redistribution for 
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Agricultural Development (LRAD) grants has been strongly rejected by these 
communities who perceive that all oftheir members should benefit from the land. 
Eckert et al (1996) add that large commercial farms are expected to remain a 
predominant feature in South Africa (owing largely to the reality of lumpy resources 
and fixed transaction and sub division costs) and it is therefore crucial that new ways 
are found to improve rural livelihoods and access to land on commercial farms 
through new ownership structures. Changing the ownership structure of commercial 
farms can redistribute wealth without adversely affecting agricultural productivity, 
farm worker employment or sacrificing economies of farm-size. 
In addition, these institutions should eliminate or reduce the potential for free-riding 
to encourage c~wners to finance improvements and to use their shared resources in 
a sustainable manner. Recent NIB literature analysing the demise of traditional 
cooperatives in favour of "new generation" cooperatives (Cook and Illiopoulos, 1999; 
2000; Porter and Scully, 1987) and investor-owned firms (Hendrikse and Veerman, 
2001 cited in Knight et aI, 2003, p. 232) explains the relative inefficiency of 
traditional cooperatives in terms of inadequate property rights that result in free- rider, 
horizon, portfolio, control and influence problems. To solve the internal free- rider 
problem, property rights (that is, benefits and voting rights) assigned to members, 
should be well defined and proportional to their individual capital contribution. 
The free-rider problem discourages member investment because some the gains from 
the cooperative accrue to individuals that did not fully invest in developing the gains. 
It is thus important that workers' interests in an equity- share scheme are not diluted 
by a transfer of shares to non- workers as a result of bequests or sales to outsiders. The 
horizon problem results from residual claims that do not extend as far as the economic 
life of the underlying asset (Porter and Scully, 1987). New members become free-
riders as they benefit from past investments without paying fully for them in the form 
of higher share prices. The portfolio problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) discourages 
members of cooperative from investing as much as they would do as shareholders in 
an investor-owned Firm. This problem arises because the cooperatives investment 
portfolio may not reflect the interests or risk attitudes of any given member. Members 
cannot trade shares at market prices and are therefore unable to diversify or 
concentrate their own asset portfolios to fully reflect personal risk preferences. The 
control problem (Sykuta and Cook, 2001) refers to the cost that members face in 
monitoring managers to ensure that they make prudent investment decisions and do 
not shirk and cheat (Porter and Scully, 1987, cited in Knight et aI, 2003, p. 234). 
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Figure 3.1 (Next Page) presents a conceptual model linking the institutional 
arrangements of farm worker equity- sharing schemes and performance. The left side 
of the figure identifies strategic points of policy and programme interventions that 
impinge directly or indirectly on the enterprise. The macroeconomic environment, 
which is influenced by domestic policy and global trade, will have an important 
bearing on the profitability of the enterprise regardless of its institutional and 
organisational features . Even the best institutional arrangements risk falling short of 
implementation without investment in human capital that enables management and 
workers to take advantage oftheir new rights and asset ownership. In particular, 
situations where land reform beneficiaries are operating with new legal structures and 
require new skills to administer their institutions, develop business plans, interpret 
financial statements and to access input, product and financial markets. A favourable 
institutional environment combined with an enabled management and workforce, 
ceteris paribus, should improve the operating efficiency of the enterprise, thereby 
increasing the profitability of fixed improvements and complementary inputs. In most 
commercial farming situations, performance also depends on access to loan finance 
from banks, net worth and debt-servicing capacity (Knight et aI, 2003, p.236). 
44 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual model of factors contributing to the performance of a 
farm worker equity-share scheme. 
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Source: Knight et ai, 2003, p. 235. 
Based on the study of the nine land reform projects, Knight et al (2003) proposed the 
45 
following empirical constructs of a farm worker equity-share scheme as given in 
Figure 3.2 (Below). The most important relationship seems to be between the 'sound 
institutional arrangements' and 'quality management' which is two-way feedback 
process. 'Sound institutional arrangements' influences 'good project performance' 
both directly and indirectly through 'effective worker empowerment. ' 






Source: Knight et aI, 2003, p. 239. 




This chapter has attempted to bring together the economic rationale for land reform in 
South Africa based on the theoretical underpinnings. It must be noted, however that 
the political and social issues also play quite a significant role. It is clear from this 
chapter that there is no blueprint approach to land reform, as each instrument should 
be designed for the particular conditions to be effective. The important aspects of both 
individual and communal tenure should be properly understood when reform 
initiatives attempt to change social relations in rural areas. In terms of the issues 
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discussed, Redistributive land reform does appear to be both economically and 
politically feasible in South Africa. Nevertheless, there must be flexibility in policies 
regarding farm- size and structure of agriculture, while support must also be given to 
proper training and extension aimed at increasing the individual farmer's managerial 
ability (Van Zyl, 1996, p. 305). 
Sound institutional arrangements are based on strong economic fundamentals and 
should be accompanied by other best practices such as provision for female 
representation in the workers' legal entity, and a general transfer of basic literacy, life 
and technical skills followed by continuous mentoring in financial, administrative and 
managerial skills so that worker representatives can perform their duties as office 
bearers,-participate meaningfully in policy decisions and ultimately establish their 
own enterprises (Knight et aI, 2003, p.247). 
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CHAPTER 4 - LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This discouragement or prohibition of black farmers was one of the major forces that 
drove Africans out of the commercial farming areas into the former homelands. 
Between 1960 and 1980 the population of the former homelands increased from 4.5 to 
11 million people (Turner and Ibsen, 2000, p.2). Evictions from white farms 
accelerated in the early 1990's, partly in response to commercial farmers' concerns 
about legislation intended to improve the security and working conditions of their 
labour. Some moved to the overcrowded homelands, while many erected shacks in 
urban shanty settlements. It is now estimated that almost 13 million of South Africa's 
40 million residents live in the former homelands, and that over 80 percent of rural 
people in South Africa in 1993 were living in poverty (Turner and Ibsen, 2000, p.2; 
South African Data Profile, 2002 cited in Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p.65). This was the 
situation facing South Africa's first democratic government as it took power in 1994 
and began to deal with land and agrarian reform. 
4.2 ELEMENTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAND REFORM 
PROGRAMME 
Faced with the need to balance strong demands from the dispossessed with the need to 
preserve the commercial farming sector and a fragile political compromise, the ANC-
led government opted for a three-pronged land reform policy: 
• Land restitution - a legal process whereby people who can prove that they 
were dispossessed of their land after 1913 can regain their land or receive due 
financial compensation for it. 
• Land tenure reform - which aims to address insecure tenure in the former 
homelands, and 
• Land redistribution - which aims to redress the racial imbalances in rural 
land ownership (Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p.66). 
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4.2.1 LAND RESTITUTION 
The restitution programme has been the most high profile and politically charged 
component of the land reform policy (De Wet, 1997, p.357). The land restitution 
programme aims to restore land to those dispossessed of their rights since 1913 
through racially discriminatory laws and practice. The objective is 'to promote justice 
and reconciliation.' The Restitution of Lands Rights Act 22 of 1994 was enacted to 
guide implementation and give it a legal basis (Cliffe, 2000, p.275). 
Lahiff (2003, p. 10) describes the institutional structure underpinning the land 
restitution process as follows: "The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
(CRLR) was established under a chief land claims commissioner and six regional 
commissioners and is an independent body, but in practice it falls under the control of 
the director-general of the department of land affairs and the minister of land affairs. 
The Land Claims Court was also established to deal with land claims and other land 
related matters. Provision is made for three broad categories of relief for claimants: 
restoration of the land under claim, granting of alternative land or financial 
compensation. " 
Following the promulgation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, Act 22 of 1994, 
members of the public were invited to submit land claims. The cut-off date for 
lodgement of restitution claims was 31 December 1998, by which date a total of 68 
878 claims had been officially lodged, including both individual, family and 
community claims in urban and rural areas (CRLR, 2002). This legal process started 
very slowly. By September 2000, 12623 households had received a total of268 306 
hectares-or less than 1 percent of the land available for redistribution. However, 
following an instruction to the Commission by president Thabo Mbeki to finalise all 
land claims by the end of 2005, the pace accelerated remarkably. Land affairs 
Director-General Gilingwe Mayende, presenting the department's annual progress 
report and plans for 2004, said 42 556 restitution claims involving 102 454 
households had been settled between 1995 and 30 September of2003. Taking the 
restitution programme alone, approximately 282 569 hectares of land had been 
restored at a total cost of about R809 million (BuaNews, 2003). 
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4.2.2 LAND TENURE REFORM 
The land tenure reform programme deals directly with the means through which land 
is owned. In particular, it seeks to address issues pertaining to the insecure, 
overlapping and disputed land rights resulting from previous systems of governance, 
especially in the former 'Bantustans' . The following laws have been enacted to 
facilitate reform: 
• The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996, a mechanism 
to protect people with insecure tenure from losing their rights and interests in 
land pending long- term reform measures; 
• The Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, which enables 
communities or groups to acquire, hold and manage property under a written 
constitution; and 
• The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, which provides for the 
purchase of land by labour tenants and the provision of subsidies to this end. 
• In addition, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 ('ESTA') 
provides for tenure security in two ways: first, by helping people living on 
rural land or semi- urban land to obtain stronger rights to the land in which 
they are living, or on land close by; and second, by laying down certain steps 
that owners and persons in charge of rural or semi urban land must follow 
before they can evict people (Cliffe, 2000, p.275). 
• The Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act, No. 94 of 1998, which 
provides for the repeal of the Rural Areas Act (Act 9 of 1987) that applied to 
the 23 so called coloured reserves in the Western Cape, Northern Cape, 
Eastern Cape, and Free State (Lahiff, 2003, p.12). 
4.2.3 LAND REDISTRIBUTION 
The aim of the redistribution programme is 'the redistribution of land to the landless 
poor, labour tenants, farm workers and emerging farmers for residential and 
productive use, to improve their livelihoods and quality oflife' (DLA, 1997, p.36). 
Since South Africa's political democratisation in 1994, three principal modes ofland 
redistribution have emerged transferring farmland to previously disadvantaged 
entrants: Government-assisted land transfers, private land purchases and equity-
sharing projects. 
4.2.3.1 GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED LAND TRANSFERS 
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Between 1994 and 1999, the South African government vigorously pursued a policy 
of market liberalisation in commercial agriculture and simultaneously implemented 
the settlement and land acquisition grant (SLAG) ofR16 000 (initially R15 000) per 
beneficiary household. In terms of the SLAG programme, historically disadvantaged 
South Africans who were landless and poor could apply for a cash grant to purchase 
and develop farmland. In practice, beneficiary households had to pool their meagre 
grants in order to buy a farm from a willing seller. The group established a legal entity 
(usually a community land trust or communal property association) that was formally 
registered as the owner of the property. In most cases, farms financed with land grants 
and settled by groups (of up to 500 households) were much too small to support all of 
the beneficiaries as full-time farmers (Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p. 66). 
The department of land affairs anticipated that emerging farmers would use the grant 
to leverage loan finance for additional land. However, most creditworthy farmers did 
not qualify for a land grant as the means test applied to potential beneficiaries 
precluded individuals with a monthly household income greater than R1 500 from 
receiving the grant. By the end of 2000, the ministry of agriculture and land affairs 
had approved 484 projects under the SLAG programme, transferring a total of 780 
407 hectares to 55 383 households of which some 14 percent were headed by women 
(Turner and Ibsen, 2000, p.12). Taken together, land restitution and land redistribution 
had transferred roughly one million hectares, or less than 1.2 percent ofthe 86 million 
hectares of white-owned farmland, to disadvantaged South Africans over a period of 
six years. Unimpressed with the performance of the SLAG programme, minister 
Didiza imposed a moratorium on further SLAG projects in July 1999 while the 
departments of agriculture and land affairs redesigned the grant programme. The 
minister released her proposals for a new programme, land redistribution for 
agricultural development (LRAD), late in 2000. The LRAD programme was 
implemented in August 2001 after several revisions. It differs from SLAG in one 
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major respect: Beneficiaries do not have to be poor to qualify for a minimum grant of 
R20 OOO-and those who have more savings and who can raise bigger loans to finance 
their farms qualify for successively larger grants. A beneficiary must inject equity and 
debt capital totalling at least R400 000 to qualify for a maximum grant ofRI00 000 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001, p.8 cited in Lyne and Darroch, 2003, 
p.65). 
This marks a distinct shift in the South African government's land redistribution 
policy away from poverty alleviation and group settlement, in favour of settling 
prospective farmers on their own farms. In its first year, LRAD redistributed 
approximately one million hectares of farmland in South Africa (Shabane, 2002 cited 
in Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p. 69). 
4.2.3.2 PRIVATE LAND PURCHASES 
Private land transactions are constrained by severe cash flow problems when loans are 
used to finance land in times of economic inflation (Nieuwoudt and Vink, 1995). 
Returns to land consist of two principal parts; rent, which represents the cash dividend 
or Current Return to the land and capital growth. Like a stock market investment, the 
current returns to agricultural land tend to be low relative to capital growth. Empirical 
evidence from the United States of America, United Kingdom and South Africa 
shows that the average annual current return to agricultural land seldom exceeds 5 
percent of its market value (Nieuwoudt, 1987, cited in Graham, 2000, p. 17). 
In South Africa, the cash flow problem associated with land purchase has been 
compounded by another impediment to private land transactions-the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act, 70 of 1970. In terms of this Act, farm-owners must get 
permission from the government to subdivide their land. This introduces uncertainty 
and delays that add to the costs of registering, surveying and transferring affordable 
parcels of land to aspiring farmers. 
Although Act 70 has been rescinded, president Mbeki has not yet signed the repeal 
into law. The delay has been attributed to the absence of national zoning legislation 
regulating the conversion of agricultural land into residential or industrial uses. 
Repeal of Act 70 will make it easier for the many poor and part-time fanners who 
will be rationed out of the LRAD programme to finance smaller, more affordable 
fanns (Graham, 2000, p.19). 
4.2.3.3 EQUITY-SHARING PROJECTS 
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Costs, delays and uncertainty associated with the fonnal transfer of small subdivisions 
of land in South Africa have contributed to the growing popularity of fann-worker 
equity-sharing projects as a means of redistributing wealth and incomes while 
maintaining or improving agricultural perfonnance (Eckert et aI, 1996, p. 693-712). 
In 1998 it was estimated that about 50 FWES projects had been initiated in South 
Africa, mostly in the Western Cape (Department of Land Affairs, 1998, p.2) and it is 
clear that this number has increased substantially in recent years. Today, FWES 
projects are spread across all nine of South Africa's provinces and involve wine, fruit, 
vegetables, olives, poultry, cut flowers, dairy and eco tourism enterprises (Knight et 
al,2002). 
In general, these projects are company operations in which financial equity is owned 
by workers, fonner owners, managers and other investors (Ngqangweni and Van 
Rooyen, 1995) in the fonn of tradable shares that define their individual rights to vote 
for directors and to benefit from the profits and capital gains generated by the 
company. FWES projects benefit from experienced management (frequently the 
fonner white owner) and have been able to attract finance from commercial banks and 
venture capitalists (Knight and Lyne, 2002). These private financiers have a strong 
incentive to help their clients build sound business organisations and to train worker-
shareholders for their active participation in a successful company. 
Case studies analysed by Knight et al (2003) show that both skills transfer and gender 
representation are positively related to the workers' share of equity in the enterprise. 
In essence, empowennent requires that workers buy a significant shareholding. 
Initially, fann workers had to finance their equity in the company with loans, creating 
the usual cash flow problems. This situation changed in 1996 when the DLA allowed 
fann workers to finance equity with SLAG grants, and in May 1999 when it piloted 
the LRCF. The LRAD programme explicitly supports equity-sharing projects 
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(Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001 cited in Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p. 
73). Based on the theoretical underpinnings given in Section 3.4, p.43 and on the 
current performance, it should noted that FWES' s are an effective and efficient tool 
for the current and future endeavours in the land process of South Africa. 
4.2.3.4 REASONS FOR FAILURE OF THE SLAG PROGRAMME 
As outlined earlier, the South African government initiated land redistribution in 
1995, offering cash grants to historically disadvantaged households who wished to 
purchase commercial farms from white owners on a willing buyer-willing seller 
basis. Together, land restitution and redistribution transferred one million hectares, or 
less than 1.2 percent of the available area, to beneficiaries during 1995-2000. Most of 
these transfers were directed to resettlement schemes on low quality land with 
communal tenure arrangements in order to reach many beneficiaries quickly and at 
modest cost (Lyne and Darroch, 2004, p.1) Apart from insufficient delivery, as of 
1999, the department of land affairs was just beginning to reach a critical level of . 
awareness that a high proportion of its redistribution projects were plagued with 
serious problems. Much attention focused on the fact that groups were too large and 
post-transfer support was poor. Upon assuming the double portfolio of minister of 
agriculture and land affairs in June 1999, Thoko Didiza called for a complete review 
of the redistribution programme. The essence of her call was that the programme 
should be broadened to cater for those aspiring to become full-time, medium-scale 
commercial farmers, and should build more on synergies between land affairs and 
agriculture (Aliber, 2003, p. 2). 
The slow pace of land reform has been attributed to two fundamental problems. First, 
it is not always feasible to partition large commercial farms into smaller, more 
affordable units due to indivisible resources and the high cost of surveying, 
transferring and registering subdivisions. Second, prospective farmers lack capital and 
are unable to finance land with mortgage loans from commercial banks due to cash 
flow problems caused by high nominal interest rates and low cash returns to land. 
Hence, more than half of the farmland redistributed in KwaZulu-Natal is c(H)wned 
by predominately white farmers and their previously disadvantaged black labourers; a 
worrisome fact given the chequered history of cooperative farming models and 
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concerns that several high profile group settlement schemes already have succumbed 
to weak institutions (Lyne and Roth, 2004, p.l). 
It would be also appropriate to examine the failure of the SLAG programme in terms 
of Christiansen's lessons from the international experience with redistributive land 
reform discussed earlier. According to Kirsten and Van Zyl (1999, p.338-339), the 
SLAG programme faltered in the following areas: 
• The speed of implementation of the programme was slow due to a 
combination of excessive bureaucracy and over-centralisation of the process, 
which rendered the programme ineffective. 
• Economic viability ofthe farm models had not been adequately addressed in 
that livelihood options available to resettled households generally indicate that 
they had insufficient land size and quality to provide at least the target income. 
Furthermore, other assistance and infrastructure necessary to generate the 
income was not readily available to beneficiaries. 
• There was no clear definition ofthe role that both the public and the non-
governmental sector should play. International evidence has shown 
conclusively that such programmes that have relied exclusively on the public 
sector in the belief that it is the only one capable of maintaining integrity, 
delivering services, determining needs and managing the process, have failed. 
• The need for additional services-infrastructure, markets, incentives, health- to 
be considered and access provided, has not received adequate attention. These 
considerations are necessary both to sustain higher productivity subsequent to 
reform and to include others who may not benefit from the direct provision of 
land. 
• Changes to the legal environment have been aimed at establishing the rights of 
particular marginalized groups. However, some major impediments have not 
been addressed yet. Research has shown that this particular is a major 
impediment to land reform within a market-led approach and will in all 
probability cause such an approach to fail 
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4.2.3.5 CAN THE LRAD PROGRAMME WORK? 
The new redistribution programme as discussed earlier, entitled land refonn for 
agricultural development, or (LRAD) was based on a model actively promoted by 
staff of the world bank, drawing on their recent experiences in Brazil and Columbia. It 
was adapted by officials of the national department of agriculture and academics from 
a South African university. Whether LRAD represented a broadening of the 
redistribution programme, or a wholesale shift, remains an issue of contention. One of 
the primary differences from the old programme is that the grant is available in a 
range from R20 000 up to RI00 ODD, depending on an own contribution which rises 
disproportionately according to the grant level (that is from R5 000 to R400 000). 
However, as significant as the change in the size of the grant is the fact that it is now 
awarded to adult individuals rather than to households, and in practice multiple adult 
members of the same household can apply for LRAD grants with the intention of 
pooling them. In fact, this is actively encouraged by government staff and private 
consultants who work with LRAD applicants (Aliber, 2003, p. 2). 
Although the LRAD programme is designed to extend larger grants to creditworthy 
farmers, there are some problems with the design and delivery of LRAD that must be 
addressed. For example, there is an implicit cap on LRAD grants imposed by 
commercial banks that usually require a debt/equity ratio of less than one when 
financing investments. Under optimal conditions when the lender is assured that the 
borrower will receive a grant, a prospective owner-operator would have to provide 
RI00 000 in own equity in order to qualify for an LRAD grant ofR90 000 and a 
commercial bank loan ofR190 000. Under conditions that are less certain, and for 
previously disadvantaged farmers that lack savings, the implicit cap on LRAD grants 
would be much less generous. 
Secondly, barriers to the subdivision of fannland imposed by the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act, 70 of 1970 will prevent many emerging fanners from making 
private purchases. LRAD discounts the impact of Act 70, stating that "pennission to 
subdivide for sale under LRAD will be effective immediately upon the launch of 
LRAD" (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2001, p 6.). While this 
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commitment is welcomed, it does not address other significant costs associated with 
the formal subdivision, registration and transfer of agricultural land. Moreover, it 
applies only to government-assisted transactions and, therefore, does nothing to 
improve market access for private buyers. Third, LRAD relies heavily on private 
"design agents" who will help prospective buyers to identify willing sellers, prepare 
their land- use plans and cash flow projections, negotiate sale agreements, arrange 
finance, and facilitate applications for LRAD. These agents are expected to recover 
most of their costs from a planning grant that is awarded once the project has been 
approved. However, this arrangement is fraught with uncertainty as there is no 
guarantee that government will approve a project. Consequently, existing landowners, 
property developers, estate agents and non-government organisations may be 
unwilling to act as design agents (Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p. 82). 
The following points summarised by Lahiff (2002, p.l5) outline the key weaknesses 
inLRAD: 
• Major new responsibilities are allocated to provincial departments of 
agriculture, with no new commitment of resources. 
• Approval criteria are even more weighted than before towards commercial 
production, with little acknowledgement of the importance of part-time 
farming as part of a survival strategy for millions of poor households. 
• No explicit role is allocated to local government, despite official emphasis on 
the importance of the third tier of government in the delivery of services. 
• Integration between different legs of land reform-tenure, restitution and 
redistribution- has remained unresolved, as do links between land reform and 
wider aspects of rural development 
• No positive mechanism to ensure that more women, the unemployed and the 
very poor can participate. 
• Volume, location and price ofland will be determined largely by current 
owners. 
• Design of projects remains in the hands of private consultants. 
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4.2.3.6 CAN REDISTRIBUTION REDRESS PAST INJUSTICES? 
The South African government introduced restitution as one of the main aspects of 
land refonn, and since restitution is unambiguous in its focus on the redress of past 
injustices, then redistribution might have been construed as a purely economic 
proposition. In fact this was never the case. The fact that redistribution also bears 
responsibility for contributing to this redress is implicit in the RDP's 30 percent 
target, which lumped redistribution and restitution together as co-contributors to the 
objective of altering the racial imbalance in land ownership. The 30 percent target is 
revealing in another way. Unlike the redress of specific injustices, as catered for 
through the restitution programme, the 30 percent target bespeaks an intention to 
redress collective grievances owing to the long history of land dispossession. In fact, 
only redistribution can do this. Whereas restitution requires proof on a case- by-case 
basis, eligibility for redistribution requires only that one is a black South African. 
This element of redressing the collective injustice is what accounts for the persistence 
of the 30 percent target in the public sphere, even though it was in the first place a 
purely arbitrary figure with no intrinsic significance. It very likely also accounts for 
the popular appeal among many black South Africans of Robert Mugabe's 'fast track 
land refonn.' According to a 2001 survey of3 700 individuals conducted by the 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 85 percent of black respondents agreed with 
the statement, "Most land in South Africa was taken unfairly by white settlers, and 
they therefore have no right to the land today," while 68 percent agreed that, "Land 
must be returned to blacks in South Africa, no matter what the consequences are for 
the current owners and for political stability in the country." The point is that social 
justice is not just about restitution, but also about the way in which one conducts 
redistribution. Thus the social justice undercurrent to redistribution very likely also 
accounts for the rejection by the Landless People's Movement and others of the whole 
willing buyer-willing seller concept, which confers on white fanners generally the 
power to decide what land will and will not be made available to blacks. The willing 
buyer-willing seller approach is also considered objectionable in that it puts people in 
the position of 'buying back their own land' even if the money largely comes from the 
state (Aliber, 2003, p.7-8). 
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The adoption of LRAD as the flagship redistribution programme marks a shift in 
favour of benefiting a few greatly. If the 30 percent target were by some miracle 
achieved, LRAD would directly assist only about 350 000 households. Will this 
contribute to a popular perception that progress is being made towards redressing past 
injustices? As yet there exists no robust way of jUdging that. However, what makes 
this unlikely is that there is little deliberate targeting among those that do benefit from 
LRAD. Those who benefit most handsomely from LRAD are not black farmers who 
have been stymied by the lack of opportunity to expand within the homelands, but 
local elites who see LRAD as an opportunity to diversify their interests to 
complement their existing business activities for example being taxi and/or bottle 
store-owners. An alternative interpretation of the various pieces of information is that 
many South Africans do indeed want land, both to support their livelihoods and as a 
matter of righting an historical wrong, but that next to job creation, more housing, and 
improved security, land is generally not a priority. In that case, LRAD is very much 
the wrong approach (Aliber, 2003, p. 9). Only time will tell whether LRAD can and 
will be successful. 
4.3 THE ROLE OF OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
4.3.1 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGO'S) 
NGO's are very often the foot soldiers ofland reform. The national land committee 
(NLC) is an active land NGO with a network of seven provincial affiliates and a head 
office in Johannesburg. It grew out of the national committee against removals that 
assisted communities fight the apartheid government's policy of forced removals and 
bantustan consolidation. NLC affiliates are independent NGOs and their size, 
strength, opinions and strategies vary across the country. They fulfil both a 
developmental role acting in partnership with government on specific projects and a 
lobbying/watchdog function (Sibanda, 2001, p.6). 
The South African land reform programme is, to a significant degree, rights-based. 
This is a matter of constitutional obligation. However rights do not have meaning 
unless the holders ofthe rights are able to enforce them consistently and effectively. 
In practice the enforcement mechanisms remain weak. Part of the solution rests with 
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legal assistance organisations with the ability to use the law in defence of the poor and 
vulnerable. The Legal Resources Centre (LRC) is one such organisation. It is the 
oldest public interest law firm in South Africa and has developed a credible track 
record in land reform issues. Other organisations are the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies at Wits and the Centre for Rural Legal Studies based in Stellenbosch 
(Sibanda, 2001, p.7). 
4.3.2 FARMERS' ORGANISATIONS 
These organisations constitute important pressure groups in the land reform sector. 
These include the national african farmers union, which, like the NLC, has 
autonomous affiliates in three provinces. Agri-SA has been an active role player in all 
land reform policies, laws and programmes. They have provincial unions and 
represent the landowning-farming sector. Most of the affiliates have predominately 
white members, with the exception of Kwanalu (the KwaZulu-Natal affiliate). The 
Agricultural Employers' Organisation is also an organisation representing white 
farming interest. 
4.3.3 THE LAND BANK 
The land bank was established in 1912 to assist in implementing government 
agricultural policy and promote white commercial farming. More than eighty years 
later, it is being radically transformed to support the development ofthe agricultural 
economy in the new South Africa and to serve a whole new set of clients. The land 
bank has been capitalised with grants of state funds and provides low-interest 
mortgages for farm purchase as well as unsecured production credit for clients with no 
security or formal financial track record. Its 'step-up' programme has assisted 36 000 
clients, not considered bankable by the commercial sector. Commercial banks are 
critical of para stata Is offering lower rates than the private banks can afford. At the 
same time, they have criticised the land bank for expanding its commercial book 
(mainly white farmers) instead of lending exclusively to black land reform farmers-a 
criticism dismissed by the land bank on the grounds that it needs commercial accounts 
to remain solvent. (Sibanda, 2001, p.8). 
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4.3.4 THE LAND REFORM CREDIT FACILITY 
The land reform credit facility was launched at the end of May 1999 with the aim of 
drawing private sector finance and human capital into commercially viable land 
reform projects (LRCF, 1999). The facility offers loans with deferred or graduated 
repayment schedules to reputable banks and venture capital investors who finance, on 
similar terms, equity-sharing projects and land purchased by aspiring farmers. In 
essence, the LRCF inherits the cash flow problem. Loans granted to financial 
intermediaries must have a deferred repayment schedule consistent with that designed 
by the intermediary for the enterprise it is financing. Otherwise, intermediaries are 
free to negotiate retail interest rates with their clients. Private lenders and investors 
who apply for loans from the LRCF are expected to conduct their financial evaluation 
and screening of projects thoroughly, adhering to sound business criteria, as they are 
putting their own resources at risk. At present the LRCF is administered by one full-
time manager whose principal task is to approve loan applications submitted by 
accredited financial intermediaries according to land reform criteria established by the 
DLA (Lyne et aI, 2000). 
The LRCF was initially capitalised at a level ofR63 million via a R32 million grant 
made by the department of land affairs that was matched by grants from the European 
Union ofR29.4 million and The Danish Agency for Development Assistance 
(DANIDA) ofR1.7 million (LRCF, 2000, p. 1 cited in Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p. 
73). Simulation exercises based on anticipated loans with deferment periods ranging 
from one to three years (longer deferment periods render most projects unprofitable) 
indicated that approximately R15 million could be disbursed annually without 
reducing the real value of the LRCF fund to a level where it would not recover in the 
longer term. Although the DLA's moratorium on land grants prevented commercial 
banks from financing all but highly elitist projects (whose beneficiaries did not 
require grants), the Facility approved loans worth R32 million between May 1999 and 
April 2001, with applications for another R34 million pending its re- capitalisation. 
Of this R32 million approved by the LRCF during its pilot phase, R4.8 million 
financed mortgage loans made to individual farmers and R27.2 million financed long 
term loans made to equity-sharing projects. In May 2001, the DLA and the European 
Union accepted proposals to re-capitalise the LRCF. The DLA approved a grant of 
R60 million during the 2001/02 financial year, and the European Union is likely to 
provide a further grant of RIO million (LRCF, 2001a). ABSA Bank, the Facility's 
largest client, intends to make much greater use of the LRCF in future, especially if 
the DLA accepts a recommendation to allocate a portion of the proposed LRAD 
grants to the LRCF and to fast track these grants to the beneficiaries ofprojects 
financed by the Facility (LRCF, 2001b, p. 53) 
4.4 THE LATEST NATIONAL STATISTICS AND DEVELOPMENTS 
Table 4.1: Land restitution claims settled by region, 31 March 2001 
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Region Lodged Settled Percentage settled 
Eastern Cape 9292 2898 31.20 
Free State / 4715 405 11.60 
Northern Cape 
Kwazulu-Natal 14808 419 2.80 
Western Cape 11 938 3860 32.30 
Gauteng / North 15843 3764 23.80 
West 
Mpumalanga 6473 3 0.05 
Northern Province 5809 330 5.70 
Total 68878 12 094 17.60 % 
Source: Lahiff, 2002, p. 9. 
The pace of restitution was extremely slow in the first four to five years, due to 
detailed and complex verification processes and legal procedures. By December 1998, 
only 31 claims had been processed. A Ministerial review of the process and an 
amendment to the Act through the Restitution Review, giving the Minister authority 
to approve settlements, shifted the implementation of the sub-programme away from 
the courts and increased the number and speed of claims settled (Department of 
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Finance, 2002, p.681). According to Lahiff (2002, p.1 0), "The pace of settlement 
increased greatly following the implementation ofthe Restitution Review, so that by .. 
June 2001 this total had risen to 12314 claims (18 percent of total claims lodged)." 
Lahiff (2002, p.1 0) further argues that, "there has been a clear bias towards urban 
claims and financial compensation. The majority of claims (approximately 49000, or 
72 percent of the total) are from urban areas and derive from forced removals under 
the Group Areas Act. About 19 000 claims, or 28 percent, are from rural areas, and 
most are community or group claims." This rural-urban bias is prevalent in the latest 
settled restitution claims: cumulative statistics as provided in Table 4.2 (Below). 
Approximately 88 percent of the claims settled were urban claims, an overwhelming 
majority. It must be noted, however, that the beneficiaries involved in the rural claims 
exceeds those involved in urban claims by a significant amount. 
Table 4.2: Cumulative statistics on settled restitution claims for the period 
1995 to 29 February 2004 (rural/urban breakdown) 
Land Financial Alternative Total Percentages Beneficiaries 




Urban 14677 25336 2477 42490 87.68 259671 
Claims 
Settled 
Rural 2743 3225 5 5973 12.32 356758 
Claims 
Settled 
Total 17420 28561 2482 48463 100 616429 
Source: Department of land affairs, 2004. 
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Table 4.3 (Below) provide the latest settled restitution claims: cumulative statistics in 
terms of the provincial breakdown. Both the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu- Natal have 
the largest number of settled restitution claims, followed by the Western Cape. The 
remaining provinces have an equally small share of the balance of the settled claims. 
It is interesting to note that Mpumulanga and Northern Cape are the provinces where 
the most land has been reallocated. So, although, the Eastern Cape and K wazulu-
Natal have the largest number of settled restitution claims, most of beneficiaries in 
these provinces opted for financial compensation rather than having the land 
reallocated. 
The fairly large amounts of financial compensation need to be closely examined. As 
discussed earlier (Section 4.2.1, p.50) President Thabo Mbeki had issued a directive 
in 2003 that all restitution claims should be settled by 2005. The result was a focus on 
resolving claims through cash payments rather than the transfer of land (Department 
of Finance, 2003, p.711). According to Greenberg (2003, p.17) this translates into just 
one-third of a per cent of total land in South Africa, and less than 0.4 percent of 
commercial agricultural land. 
Table 4.3: Cumulative statistics on settled restitution claims As At 29 
February 2004 (provincial breakdown) 
Hectares 
Province Claims Households Beneficiaries reallocated 
Eastern Cape 12943 26742 112664 28338 
Free State 2031 2718 18460 43315 
Gauten~ 9312 9304 45493 3453 
K wazulu-N atal 10332 22909 140591 132379 
Mpumulan~a 1354 14124 78337 240014 
North West 1237 11881 63770 71484 
Northern Cape 1501 5273 31936 233634 
Limpopo 1209 12722 53577 54575 
Western Cape 8544 11653 71601 3100 
Total 48463 117326 616429 810292 













In South Africa, the most recent policy debate has centred on the Communal Land 
Rights Bill, the threats issued by the landless people's movement (LPM) to forcibly 
occupy white owned commercial farms, and the enactment of a new legal provision 
that allows expropriation of land. 
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An amendment to the 1994 Restitution Act was passed late last year to empower the 
minister of agriculture and land affairs to expropriate commercial farms required for 
restitution purposes, if negotiation with a commercial farmer failed. However, the 
amendment still obliged the Government to pay compensation at the market price as 
provided for in the Constitution, thus protecting the property rights of commercial 
farmers. The laws affecting farm dwellers' rights- the Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act-are reportedly to be amended, and 
possibly consolidated into one. It is not clear in what ways this will affect the content 
of their tenure rights and the draft legislation has not been made public (Marongwe 
and Palmer, 2004, p.7). 
The Communal Land Rights Bill was finally passed by Parliament in February 2004 
and has been forwarded to the President to be signed into law. However, the President 
has not yet assented to it and so it is not yet an Act. It appears, though this is not 
officially confirmed, that the President is seeking further legal opinion on its 
constitutionality, so further delays are possible. At the same time, the department of 
land affairs has stated publicly that it cannot begin to implement the Bill until 2005. 
One of the most controversial aspects of the Bill is the one that imposes traditional 
councils as the bodies that will administer communal land. This aspect was first 
introduced on 17 October and public hearings around the bill were held within three 
weeks of this date. Concerns have been raised on whether or not the Bill has been 
properly debated either within the rural branches of the ANC or within rural society 
within such a short timeframe. In essence, the Bill gives traditional leaders power over 
rural land, and thereby power over the lives of the people who live on the land. For 
this reason, it has been criticised for potentially negatively affecting the plight for 
rural women who suffer severe discrimination under current customary systems. 
Many civil society critics (Claasens, 2004; Walker, 2004) in their submissions on the 
Bill, pointed out that a critical omission was the absence of community consultation 
on whether or not they desired a transfer title, or on the form and content of land 
rights. 
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On 10 January 2004, the LPM issued a press statement entitled 'Ten years of failed 
land reform is enough', launching a 'No land, no vote' campaign towards the 
forthcoming election. The LPM demanded a national land summit to discuss the 
fundamental constraints to effective land reform and an immediate moratorium on all 
forced removals and evictions. In April while South Africa was holding its national 
elections, about 62 members of the Gauteng LPM were arrested as they tried to stage 
a peaceful protest. Those arrested included the core leadership of the LPM in the 
province and other activists. 
In terms of progress, a total of 2 493 566 hectares of land has been transferred through 
all aspects ofland reform since 1994. This amounts to 2.9 percent of commercial 
agricultural land, excluding the former homelands. The target remains to transfer 30 
percent of this land by 2015. Ofthe 2.5 million Hectares, 810292 hectares have been 
transferred through restitution and 1 683275 hectares through redistribution and 
tenure reform. In the latter category, just under 12 percent of households benefiting 
are female-headed. 
Overall, the budget for land reform has been increased in the financial year 2004 / 5, 
now amounting to a little under 0.5 percent of the national budget: Rl.4 billion. 
Within this, the budget for 'restitution' (most of which has in the past been spent on 
cash compensation rather than land acquisition) accounts for R933 million and the 
budget for 'land reform' to fund redistribution and tenure reform stands at R474 
million. Although the latter has been growing slowly, the capital budget for land 
acquisition has been declining in real (and nominal) terms and is only due to return to 
200112 levels by next financial year. In the meantime, approved projects have been 
put on hold, and land cannot be transferred in a number of provinces due to a lack of 
funds. This is in direct contrast with previous years, when the budget was regularly 
under- spent (Marongwe and Palmer, 2004, p.8). 
On the policy front: the Minister of Agriculture, Thoko Didiza, recently launched the 
Agricultural Black Economic Empowerment (Agribee) document, the objective of 
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which she stressed was to eliminate racial discrimination in the agricultural sector 
through implementing initiatives that mainstream black South Africans in all levels of 
agricultural activity and enterprises along the entire agricultural value chain can 
benefit from (Byford-Jones, 2004, p.7). 
Some of the specific objectives include: 
• Promoting equitable access and participation of historically disadvantaged 
individuals in the entire value chain. 
• De-racialising land and enterprise ownership, control, skilled occupations 
and management of existing and new agricultural enterprises. 
• Facilitating structural changes in agricultural support systems. 
• Development initiatives to assist black South African in owning, 
establishing, participating in and running agricultural enterprises. 
She stressed that in this document it was further proposed that the sector makes 
available additional 20 percent (beyond the target of 30 percent as set in the RDP) of 
agricultural land to the historically disadvantaged individuals and communities 
through leasehold. 
Didiza added that it as also necessary to look at the roll-{)ut of the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) of government in order to address certain 
challenges that the emerging farms would still face. She announced that a steering 
committee would be appointed that adequately reflects the agricultural sector and 
government, which would be tasked, "with the onerous job of undertaking 
consultations, information sharing in order to deepen clarification, particularly 
disempowered groups. By November I would want the steering committee to provide 
me with a final report on the framework consultative process in order to submit this to 
my colleagues" (Byford-Jones, 2004, p.7). 
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CHAPTER 5 - BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR IN SOUTH 
AFRICA'S LAND REFORM PROGRAMME 
The department of land affairs (1997) set a priority on the participation of, "women, 
the poor and the landless in South Africa's land reform programme," three groups 
who are especially vulnerable in rural areas. In light of the unsatisfactory performance 
to date of the land reform programme and the land redistribution programme in 
particular, this chapter examines the underlying causes by focusing on the many 
barriers to participation in the land reform programme and land redistribution in 
particular, that current and potential beneficiaries have faced and are likely to be 
facing in the future. These barriers are wide ranging. They encompass all aspects of 
life from the very technical issues like the definition of a community in South Africa 
to the very practical crisis ofHIV / AIDS and its devastating consequences in South 
Africa. Though they seem disparate, they all emphasize the enormous challenge faced 
by current and potential land reform beneficiaries. 
5.1 THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING A 'COMMUNITY' IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONTEXT 
The stated aims of policy makers is to develop policies which will have a positive 
impact on the poorest people of South Africa, including those who live in the rural 
areas of the former 'Bantustans ' . In policy documents, the involvement of 
' communities' is regarded as central to achieving these goals. As part ofthe new 
political dispensation, it is argued that rural communities should have a stake in their 
own development and that it is their constitutional right to have a direct contribution 
in matters affecting their future (Kepe, 1999, pAlS). 
Few developmental theorists and practitioners can deny that the term 'community' is 
one of the most commonly used terms in development circles. However, it has also 
been recognised as being highly elusive, with several competing interpretations 
(Cousins, 1989; Selznick, 1996; McLain and Jones, 1997). In this regard, Bernard 
(1973) suggests three basic characteristics of a community; (1) shared locale, (2) 
common ties and (3) social interaction. The first and second characteristic will be 
further elaborated in this study (Cited in Kepe, 1999, p. 418). 
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The most common definition of 'community' in sociological studies refers to people 
who share a common locality (Selznick, 1996). Conversely, Bernard (1973) argues 
that the phrase 'the community' is more aptly linked to people in a particular 
geographical location. In the former homelands of South Africa, the chiefs and 
headmen who were responsible for the allocation of new sites have, throughout the 
twentieth century, primarily controlled the location of an individual household within 
a particular environment. The most important factor in deciding where a new site 
would be located was the immediate neighbours who had to give their approval. In the 
former Transkei, these neighbours would be organised in a well-defined geographical 
cluster within the village, often centring around a dominant lineage, and with their 
own subheadmen. The name given to such groupings is izithebe (singular-isithebe) or 
mat associations. Hence, the negotiation of the concept of a community as a spatial 
unit involved at least four different social actors: (1) the applicant, (2) the traditional 
authority, (3) the formal administrative structure and (4) the people of the isithebe. 
After the all inclusive elections of 1994, the structure and role oflocal government 
changed. In rural areas this change put into question the historical roles of the state 
and traditional authorities in defining 'communities' in terms of space. In 1995, a 
two- tier system of rural local government was established at regional level (district 
council) and local level (Transitional Representative Councils, or TRC's). The TRC's 
were not given the powers of a fully fledged local authority, but relied heavily on the 
district councils where they could represent their constituencies. The role of 
traditional leaders was restricted to that of custodians and custom with their land 
allocation powers effectively having been removed (Department of Provincial Affairs 
and Constitutional Development-DPACD, 1998). Instead, legal entities comprising of 
holders ofland rights in a particular area are given the responsibility of deciding the 
spatial 'community' (Cited in DLA, 1998). 
A 'community' can also be defined in terms of economic relationships, here different 
social actors share common interests, control particular or practise similar economic 
activities to make their livelihoods (Dikeni et al 1996, cited in Kepe, 1999, p. 420). In 
the former 'Bantustans' of South Africa, people who come from different villages or 
localities frequently share several resources, such as river, large dams, forests, the 
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coast and grazing land (Kepe, 1997). In addition, these shared resources may more 
often than not 'legally' belong to somebody else, for example the state. The main 
issue is whether these two characteristics (,community' as a spatial unit and 
'community' as an economic unit) can be reconciled. In the land reform programme, 
where both historical ownership and long term use are important for deciding land 
rights, this is crucial. In the case when different 'communities' (spa al or economic 
units) exist within or claim rights to one geographical area, conflict management 
becomes critical before any land reform programme can be effectively implemented. 
Many South African authors including Cross (1997) assert that clarity ofland rights is 
a precondition for economic development in the former homeland areas. If land rights 
are clarified or secured, without the economic liberation of the previous!. 
disadvantaged poor people in rural area land reform will not efficiently contribute to 
redressing the imbalances between the various race groups in South Africa. 
Conversely, economic development initiatives, designed to alleviate poverty in rural 
areas, can result in new 'communities' being formed or old ones being fragmented. 
Such setbacks have already emerged in the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative 
(SDI) in the Eastern Cape Province (Kepe, 1999, p. 422). 
Since land rights and economic benefits are necessarily closely linked in the new 
policy frameworks of post-apartheid South Africa, a situation arises where new 
'communities' emerge and old ones disintegrate in the context of rapid social change. 
Sometimes there is a recall of past associations by group, to ensure that they are seen 
as part of the beneficiary community. Ultimately, it is argued that the use ofthe term 
'community' in South Africa's land reform programme has both positive and negative 
effects on the beneficiaries. Effects are positive when they help focus on the needs of 
poor people, but negative when they compel conflicting groups together in a mode 
which results in the rights of the weaker group being trampled on by the actions of a 
more dominant group (Kepe, 1999, p.431). 
5.2 THE MARKET -LED 'WILLING BUYER-WILLING SELLER' 
APPROACH 
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As explained earlier, the thrust behind market-led approach was a hybrid of pressures 
and perspectives. On the one hand, policy grew out of those initiatives concerned with 
land issues during the previous decade's mounting mobilisation against apartheid. 
These involved struggles to assert the claims of those who had lost rights to land or 
who were threatened with loss of access. On the other hand, this approach to 
redistribution through grants and land transfer through the market was also in line 
with the economic thinking of the World Bank and other international experts wedded 
to a market-led land reform. The following reasons as provided in Table 5.1 is a 
summary of the justification for the market-led approach for South Africa's Land 
redistribution programme as given by the World Bank officials and other experts. 
Table 5.1: Reasons for the adoption of the market-led approach In South 
Africa as given by World Bank officials and other experts. 
(1) Political It is essential so as to avoid 'decades oflikely insurrection, 
possibly civil war, combined with capital flight and 
economic decline.' 
(2) Micro- A 'small farmer' strategy will lead to inverse economies of 
economic scale, through more intensive use of labour and relatively 
less capital (hitherto available through unjustified 
subsidies to 'white-owned' farms). 
(3) Macro- The transfer ofland will allow a resolution of the 'debt-
economic crisis' affecting many white-owned commercial farms as 
result of liberalisation and removal of subsidies, without 
The need to devote state revenues to debt relief. 
Source: Cliffe, 2000, p. 277. 
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In the original policy documents (Department of Land Affairs, 1997) the land 
redistribution was to be demand-led, meaning that only those who are able to evince 
considerable interest in and capacity to become productive farmers will be able to 
access the programme. This is the "willing-buyer" portion ofthe "willing buyer-
willing seller" framework. Demand-led targeting has the advantage of preserving 
productivity in the agricultural sector, since participation tends to be limited to those 
who can and indeed must make productive use of the land (Biswanger and Deininger, 
1993). 
In a world of perfect markets, demand-led targeting, which implements a shadow 
willingness-to-pay criterion, would also ensure that the land goes to those who most 
want it. The disadvantage of demand-led targeting is that in a world of multiple 
market imperfections (many arising out of the legacy of apartheid), the participation 
requirements will tend to favour those rural blacks who already have a reasonable 
strong asset base and will tend to exclude those who have none. If the poor prove to 
be unwilling or unable to meet the necessary level of interest or capacity, they will 
ultimately be barred from participation in the land redistribution programme. 
Furthermore, with the substantial expense of the programme, as well as its 
prominence in the government's rural anti-poverty agenda, a failure to participate 
may very well mean continued poverty (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 1440). 
As Van Rooyen and Njobe-Mbuli (1996, p.469) indicate, " A market-based land 
redistribution strategy, in all probability, will only benefit the upper emerging 
commercial classes, while landless people may be deprived even more of scarce 
production resources due to their inherent inability to compete in the market for 
agricultural support and inputs". 
5.3 UP-FRONT COSTS 
The land redistribution programme includes substantial direct and indirect up-front 
costs to the beneficiaries in terms of money and labour. Such up-front costs will 
include direct programme participation costs, moving costs, the costs of new 
equipment, application and search costs, necessary land improvements (such as 
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fencing) and the opportunity costs of forgone activities during the transition period. 
These costs are likely to be more binding on poor households than rich ones. They are 
therefore likely to serve as a barrier to participation by the very groups that the land 
redistribution would like to target. Settling large numbers of black households on 
previous white- owned farms will necessitate the construction of new housing. 
Furthermore, small-scale infrastructural improvements, notably fencing and water 
supply, will be the responsibility of the land redistribution beneficiaries. 
Among the largest up-front costs is the own-contribution necessitated by the demand 
-led rationing of the programme benefits. The own contribution envisioned by Van 
den Brink, de Klerk and Biswanger (1996) is Rl 735 at 1993 prices. This figure is 20 
percent of the cost ofland, livestock and machinery necessary to settle a household. A 
very rough, but conservative, estimate of the up-front to the beneficiaries therefore 
reaches about R5 400. This amount represents only the out-of-pocket expenses that 
can be delayed, expenses to be paid out of the land grant or the direct and indirect of 
the application process itself. Households are unlikely to be able to obtain this money 
by borrowing, since credit markets are thin or absent in rural South Africa, and since 
poor people engaging in a new and for them unproven form of production would not 
make a good credit risk. May (1996) states that even informal credit stokvels are out 
of reach ofthe poor and that formal credit is unattainable for them (Cited in 
Zimmerman, 2000, p. 1443). 
Van den Brink et al (1996) anticipate that part of the own~contribution could be made 
in terms of 'sweat-equity'. However, poor households and female-headed households 
face binding labour constraints that make the contribution of labour as challenging as 
that of money. Furthermore, the move and transition to a new area will itself be labour 
-intensive and demand a considerable amount of labour time. 
5.4 RISK AVERSION 
Risk aversion in general tends to be greater among poor people than among wealthier 
people (Zimmerman and Crater, 1997; Morduch, 1994 cited in Zimmerman, 2000, p. 
1443). Poor people living close to subsistence are gambling with their health and their 
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lives when they take major financial risks. Poor people have a substantially lower 
capacity to self-insure than wealthier people and are less likely to have access to 
formal insurance. Informal insurance works best within extended families; when there 
is a high correlation of incomes within families. For these reasons, the increased risk 
of participation in the land redistribution programme will be of primary concern to 
poor households. Table 5.2 shows several important sources of risk in the land 
redistribution to participating households. 
Table 5.2: Potential sources of risk in the land redistribution programme to 
participating households. 
(1) Profitability Eligible households face uncertainty about the profits in 
the former white areas to which they will be resettled. 
Furthermore, the large subsidies which ensured white 
agricultural prosperity have now been rescinded. 
(2) Agricultural There is both yield risk and input and output price risk. 
risk 
(3) Non- Households face uncertainty about the availability and 
agricultural wages of non-agricultural employment. 
employment 
(4) Opportunity Households may fear that by accepting the benefits of the 
cost land redistribution they are putting their current remittance 
income in danger 
Source: Zimmerman, 2000, p. 1444. 
5.5 HUMAN CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS 
Agricultural skill is a key factor in making the beneficiaries of land reform successful 
farmers in the long run. Considerable evidence exists to suggest that human capital is 
as important to successful agriculture as land access. Van Zyl (1996) finds that human 
capital is one of the most consistent and economically important predictors of farm 
efficiency. 
74 
A great deal of the physical displacement of blacks occurred before the apartheid era 
(pre 1948), so that numerous potential beneficiaries are three generations or more 
removed from their families' occupation ofredistributable land. Furthermore, since 
land expropriated after 1913 is covered under restitution programme, the restitution 
programme will necessarily be composed of beneficiaries who have a distant 
connection to the land to which they will gain access. The failure of the land reform 
programme to budget funds for training in the vital skills of farming implies an 
assumption that beneficiaries either already have such skills or will acquire the 
necessary training themselves. Even part-time farming demands fairly extensive 
training which includes a basic understanding of bookkeeping, pesticide application, 
fertilizer demands, planting and replanting times, crop associations and rotations and 
risk management (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 1446). 
The human capital constraint is further worsened by South Africa's history of 
discrimination against blacks in education, from the 19th century through to the 
apartheid era, which has left a legacy of a black-white education gap that extends to 
farm managerial ability in economically effective ways. In the words of Helena Dolny 
(1991, p. 218), " . .. major demand groups [for redistributable land] are unevenly 
skilled and hardly constitute an independent rich or middle peasantry or even tenants 
who are just waiting to emerge and expand their production opportunities through 
access to land. Apartheid effectively succeeded in eliminating most independent 
commodity producers in the 'Bantustans' areas." 
Subsequently, agricultural human capital in the former homelands is both scarce 
generally and unevenly distributed. As the poor currently lack sufficient agricultural 
skills and because they will have immense difficulty in acquiring them, the value of 
the land reform programme and land redistribution in particular will be less to them 
than it is to more agriculturally experienced wealthier black farmers. In a demand-led 
rationing system and without considerable investment in agricultural training, the poor 
my well be rationed out (Zimmerman, 2000, p.1449). 
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5.6 TIME POVERTY 
The poverty alleviation potential of the land refonn programme depends heavily on 
the assumption of surplus rural labour. If poverty is the result of expropriation of 
productive assets, the argument goes, then restoring those assets will enable the poor 
to put their surplus labour capacity to work, generating incomes for the poor at no loss 
of efficiency and possibly a potential gain to the Macro economy. However, a large 
volume of evidence suggests that labour is as much a constraint on increased 
production as land. In a nonparametric analysis of rural income in Kwazulu-Natal, 
Carter and May (1999) find that the burden of household chores significantly reduces 
household income generation and that the differences are class-based. Zimmennan 
(1998, cited in Zimmennan, 2000, p. 1448) adds that labour is scarce both because of 
the historically distorted demographic structure in the fonner homelands and a dismal 
record of government neglect of local services and infrastructure that has raised the 
labour cost of daily living and household maintenance which is tenned 'time poverty' . 
Although land is scarce is the fonner homelands, labour is also scarce, so severe 
overpopulation has existed for years with under utilization ofland. Lyne and 
Niewoudt (1991) report that 22 percent of arable land in Kwazulu-Natal is unused. 
Table 5.3 (Below) summarises the possible explanations for this under utilisation of 
land and scarcity oflabour in the fonner homelands. 
Table 5.3: Possible explanations for the under utilisation of land and labour 
scarcity in the former homelands. 
(1) Multiple market There are missing labour and land rental markets preventing the 
imperfections usual equalisation of factor returns across plots (Lyne and 
Niewoudt, 1991). 
(2) Oscillating The patterns of oscillating migration have historically denuded 
labour black areas of working-age men leaving an economy of 
migration women, children and the elderly. Under South Africa's settler 
patterns colonialism the fonner homelands were viewed as reserves of 
labour (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). 





According to Zimmerman (1998), the lack of government 
infrastructure and services enforces a labour intensive, 
cumbersome form of household maintenance for rural 
households. In his study he found that whereas former 
homeland blacks spend 54.35 hours per week per household 
collecting wood and water, non-rural households spend only 
3.28 hours per week per household in these tasks. In this way, 
virtually all of the productive labour power of a typical rural 
household could be used up in necessary household tasks, 
leaving almost nothing for wage work or agriculture. 
Source: Zimmerman, 2000, p. 1449. 
The labour constraints of the former homeland areas are likely to persist with the land 
redistribution programme, as households will be asked to move to areas with 
insufficiently developed water and sanitation infrastructure and with uncertainty about 
the development of a necessarily denser infrastructure of roads, clinics, schools and 
electricity grids. 
5.7 THE IMPACT OF HIV I AIDS 
The impact this epidemic has on rural development and livelihood cannot go 
unnoticed. AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) affects the very same 
people that development is intended for. It therefore becomes a challenge for policy 
makers to ensure that all development programmes in rural communities integrate 
HIV I AIDS in their planning. The causes and challenges ofHIV (Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus) are closely associated with wider challenges to development, such 
as poverty, food and livelihood insecurity, and gender inequality. In effect HIV/AIDS 
tends to exacerbate existing development problems through its catalytic effects and 
systematic impact. 
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Poverty and access to basic resources are one of the factors that exacerbate this 
epidemic. In addressing this it therefore becomes important to address the root causes 
and consequences of the wider challenges of rural development. Rather than 
developing a programme that deals only with HIV I AIDS, the government needs to 
establish a programme that will improve and bring value to lives of people. Land 
reform and security of tenure leads to development in rural communities. Very little 
investment will be made in land that has no ownership (Zwane, 2001, p.3). 
Moreover, due consideration must be given to the relationships between people and 
institutions as shown in Figure 5.1 (Below). People who should benefit from land 
reform are being infected and affected in homes and communities, and their reality is 
changing. At the same time, institutions are having their capacity undermined, and 
long term trends indicate the worst is yet to come. It is only when we start to consider 
the two aspects simultaneously, that we can really begin to plan appropriately. Many 
of the implications for land reform stem not only from HIV infection and direct illness 
and death, but from knock-on effects on both people and on institutions. 
Figure 5.1: HIV/AIDS infected and affected-households and communities, 
institutions and sectors 
HIV 
infection 
Source: Mullins, 2001, p. 5. 
/ 











In South Africa, the land refonn programme does not address HIV/AIDS issue. The 
only programme that is available is one that deals with the staff and employees of the 
department of land affairs. As an agent responsible for land refonn it has not 
committed it self to address HIV/AIDS issues in the execution of its duties. 
According to Dan Mullins Regional HIV Coordinator for the Oxfam G.B. Regional 
Management Centre (2001, p. 9) based on the current trends ofHIV/AIDS across 
South Africa, it can be reliably assumed that; 
1) Families badly hit by AIDS are likely to be excluded from the land refonn 
process. 
2) About 15-35 percent of adults who could benefit from land refonn are already 
HIV positive, although virtually none of them know it. They will begin to fall 
ill from chronic illness leading to death within the next 5-10 years. 
3) Many other adults being resettled, and many of the children in their families, 
will in future become HIV positive and go on to develop AIDS. 
Adams and Howell (2001) refer to the weak capacity of some governments to 
implement meaningful land refonn. This capacity will only be undennined due to 
AIDS, so any current and future thinking about objectives and strategies must be 
based in part on an assessment of the impacts of HIV I AIDS on internal organizational 
capacity to plan and implement land refonn. There are two possible two ways in 
which AIDS can affect institutions: 
1) Staff (including senior managers) are themselves people living in societies 
with 15 - 35 percent adult HIV prevalence. 
2) Clientele of institutions, along with their needs, objectives, abilities, and 
constraints, are being affected by HIV I AIDS 
Some of the main internal impacts on institutions can be summarized; 
1) Lower productivity (absenteeism from attending funerals, caring for others, 
illness during which there will be additional workload on other staff), 
2) Direct costs of health care, 
3) Human resources and workforce planning: harder and more expensive to hire 
in good staff, and retain them long enough for them to develop and use their 
expenence. 
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Ultimately as suggested by Dan Mullins (2001, p.8), the land refonn process in South 
Africa should seek to achieve a range of objectives in order to: 
• Maximise appropriate access, with attention to particular needs of those 
infected and affected by HIV and AIDS 
• Support productive use in the long-tenn, including those affected and infected 
by HIV and AIDS. 
• Minimise HIV transmission and improve care and treatment for those who are 
ill, through provision of essential services. 
If the land refonn process in Southern Africa simply transfers access to families in 
which everyone is relatively healthy and makes no efforts to help families of those 
who later become chronically ill to retain and cultivate their land, then the process 
will not be seriously contributing to its stated goals of long tenn poverty alleviation 
and economic development. 
CHAPTER 6 - SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
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In April of 1994, a new democratic South Africa was born. The extension of political 
rights to the entire nation was an event celebrated globally. The raising of the new 
South African flag was testimony that a profound change had occurred. Over ten 
years later, the spirit of reconciliation and nation building have died down somewhat 
and been replaced by optimism based on the recent elections promises of 'a people's 
contract to fight poverty and create jobs.' Notwithstanding newly won political 
freedoms, approximately half of South Africa's 44 million people and two thirds of its 
African population still live in deep poverty. Seven million people live in shacks, 
disease morbidity levels remain high and a disproportionate number of poor people 
reside in rural and semi urban areas. South Africa also has one of the most skewed 
distributions of income in the world ("the top 5 percent of the population consume 
more than the bottom 85 percent") and the national unemployment rate is currently 
between 40 and 50 percent (Bond, 1996 cited in Levin and Weiner, 1997, p. 5). 
Based on these striking statistics it must be stated that the ten-year period of 
democracy in South Africa is too short a timeframe in which to measure success or 
failure of the land reform programme. As Martin Adams (1999) argues: 
"It took one hundred years to construct South Africa's land tenure map. It 
absorbed the energies of colonial invaders (all the king's soldiers and all the 
king's men) and all the demonic intensity of the apartheid state. How long will 
it take to dismantle it? From a comparative perspective, we must recognise 
that this is but the first round of land reform in this country. Looking to the 
experience of other countries we can see that land reform seldom is 
accomplished in one go. It emerges on the political agenda as a result of 
widespread landlessness and insecurity among the population as a whole 
where access to the land and other productive assets is marked by historical 
legacies of inequality. Land reform will continue to re-emerge over time as an 
important political issue for as long as large numbers of the poor reside in 
rural areas in conditions of poverty and extreme inequality." 
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Considering the political rivalries and contradictions that the DLA has had to 
negotiate in the fairly short period of its existence and its limited administrative 
capacity to implement policy, it is unrealistic to expect a dramatic "reconstruction" of 
South Africa's rural landscape. In terms of identifying and defining the rights to the 
land, balancing interests between the various stakeholders and the facilitation of 
negotiation and consensus seeking, it would be unkind to describe the reform process 
a total failure (Drimie, 2000, p.240). After all, "any process of rural institutional and 
social transformation has to proceed carefully, mindful of the brittle nature of social 
networks and the enormous damage that has been wrought on people's lives by 
decades of underdevelopment and abuse" (Walker, 1994, p.349). 
Land reform in South Africa is not merely reallocating land from one group of people 
to another. It is about changing power structures and socio-economic relations; it is 
about ensuring a better livelihood for the previously disadvantaged rural poor. Bold 
political measures, imaginative land use policies and technical packages that may be 
envisaged require a great deal of thought, debate, research and pilot projects (Ghimire, 
2001, p.25). 
This study aimed to synthesise the land reform programme in South Africa in terms of 
its multifaceted political and legal policy origins, arrangements and the 
implementation thereof, with due regard to the intemationallessons and experiences. 
The criticisms that follow are meant to be constructive guidelines and should be 
understood as such. Ultimately, it must be noted that land reform is a long process, 
with explicit and implicit struggles and with multiple tensions. One may hope for 
effective governments able to achieve their ambitious goals in terms oftheir land 
reform programmes, but it is only reasonable to suspect that large numbers of landless 
workers who hope desperately for help through land reform are likely to meet with 
disappointment and despair. 
Cherryl Walker (2004, p.11-12) aptly summarises the current political and popUlist 
opinions regarding the land reform process in South Africa: 
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"Land reform ... is overloaded with the claims of history and the twinned but 
incongruent imperatives of redress for the past and development for the future 
that that has bequeathed us. It is also hobbled by the constraints of the present, 
including not only the relative marginality of the rural areas politically and 
economically, but also the indifferent-uncooperative-natural environment in 
which it is to work its remedy. Popular expectations have been shaped by a 
'master narrative' of quintessentially rural dispossession and restoration that, 
while not, broadly, untrue, is no longer directly relevant to today's 
developmental challenges. It focuses too narrowly on the s~alled 'white' 
countryside, underplays the importance of urban land reform and the former 
reserves, and underestimates the contemporary challenges to agriculture. It is 
not that land issues and land reform are not important for the millions who do 
look to the land to provide or supplement a living ..... It is that successful 
programmes of restitution, redistribution and enhanced tenure security will, at 
best, provide only some of the preconditions for emancipation from oppression 
and poverty ... " 
The struggle of the people of South Africa is not over. Indeed, political freedom has 
been achieved but the struggle now c~mtinues on the economic front, with land reform 
unquestionably being at the forefront of government's policy agenda for a long time 
to come. 
6.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: 
6.2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
In terms of the International Perspective, in order for land reform to achieve some 
measure of success: 
1) Governments must have the capacity to provide family-scale farms, secure 
titles, adequate credit and technical know-how; 
2) Governments must promote the market strength of small farmers 
internationally as well as locally; 
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3) Governments must accommodate the long-term technological displacement of 
much rural employment by stemming population growth and finding new 
kinds of jobs for those on the land; and 
4) International agribusiness and governments must reduce their subsidies to 
domestic farmers, so that unfair competitive practices are ended while its 
controls over prices along the chain of production are better regulated. 
The last point is worth highlighting, as there has not been a direct focus on the effects 
of globalisation and its implications for land reform processes. Global market forces 
pose a major challenge to effective land reform efforts when international 
agribusiness uses its vast power to advantage. For example, international agribusiness 
may sell cereals at prices below those on local markets due to generous price supports 
given by the United States of America and the European Union to their large 
commercial farmers, who gain access to poorer markets due to liberal trading 
agreements. 
Admittedly, world trade accords do make it possible for increased Asian, African and 
Latin American exports to richer countries, but the farms that supply this demand are 
almost always on such a large- scale that is likely to have no significant effect on the 
poor families in these regions (Smith, 2002). It is these poor families who are in most 
cases the target groups in their respective government's land reform programmes. 
6.2.2 FARM WORKER EQUITY-SHARE SCHEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Farm worker equity- share schemes may never satisfy everyone's view ofland reform. 
Nevertheless, recent experience suggests that FWES represent a viable mode of 
redistributing wealth and de-racialising commercial agriculture in South Africa. The 
following policy recommendations can be made: 
It is recommended that DLA grants should be awarded only to beneficiaries of 
projects that are co- financed by a private investor, commercial bank or other 
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reputable institution as this ensures in depth financial analysis. In addition this 
approach eliminates the need for a separate financial analysis by the DLA and would 
reduce the time taken for grant approval. Excessive delays in grant disbursement hold 
up the empowerment process and have a detrimental influence on the project's 
solvency and liquidity. 
It is recommended that the DLA should research the history of labour relations on the 
farms that apply for the LRAD grants to establish equity-sharing projects. Objective 
measures of mutual trust and respect might include a comparative analysis of current 
conditions of employment, skills training, average length of service, turnover in the 
workforce and institutional practices for hearing and settling labour disputes. 
The DLA should consider extending its grants to regular but seasonal farm workers 
who wish to participate in established farm worker equity- share schemes. At present, 
only permanent employees are eligible for grants (Knight and Lyne, 2002, p. 371). 
6.2.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAND REFORM EXPERIENCE 
Based on research undertaken by Adams et al (1999), as part of the Overseas 
Development Institute, the following summary of policy implications concerning land 
tenure reform measures can be suggested: 
Firstly, land use in communal areas, where the state is the registered owner needs to 
be properly regulated and recorded in terms of traditional customs and practices used 
by the local communities. Secondly, land rights should be vested with land users and 
not institutions that may not always act in the best interest of land users. Thirdly, 
tenure reform needs to decentralised and daily management should be the 
responsibility oflocallevel decision- making structures. Fourthly, as pointed put in 
Section 5.6, p.79 earlier women make up the majority of economically active 
population in rural areas and it is therefore vital to promote measures to strengthen 
women's access to land. Lastly, tenure reform must be flexible in allowing right 
holders the opportunity to create and / or modify current rules when an opening arises. 
A comprehensive study (Deininger et aI, 1999) of the land reform programme in 
South Africa was undertaken in 1999, by prominent researchers of the World Bank, 
DLA and two reputable South African Universities and the following policy 
recommendations are a summary of the broad conclusions of this study: 
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Firstly, poor people who rely on land refonn for subsistence would benefit greatly if 
some of the qualification requirements for joining the programme were dropped. 
Secondly, the land refonn programme could be more effective if it was significantly 
integrated into government's RDP programme. Thirdly, beneficiaries should be 
required to make their own contribution to address to challenges associated with 
ownership and economic success. Fourthly, increasing awareness through media 
campaigns would greatly reduce training and infrastructure costs. Lastly, de 
centralisation ofproject approval to local government if they have the capacity, would 
speed up the implementation and hence the productivity and efficiency of the land 
refonn process. 
Based on the discussion of the government's latest LRAD programme in tenns of 
Lyne and Darroch (2003, p.83) Section 4.2.3.5, p.58, the following policy 
recommendations can be made: 
Firstly, obstacles preventing the repeal of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, 
70 of 1970, must be addressed without further delay. Scrapping this Act will make it 
easier for those poor and part- time farmers who are rationed out of the LRAD 
programme to obtain finance for smaller, more affordable fanns. Secondly, the 
government should also contain or reduce the inflation rate, and lower the statutory 
costs of subdividing and transacting fannland, to assist commercial banks when 
financing prospective fanners and equity shareholders. 
Recent invasions of commercial fanns in Zimbabwe highlight the urgent need for 
bold interventions to deracialise the structure of commercial agriculture in South 
Africa. An effective alternative to the destructive "fast track" policy adopted in 
Zimbabwe is to subsidise interest rates for a finite period on loans made to 
creditworthy land refonn projects. The problems associated with cheap credit 
programmes are well documented and have encouraged the South African 
government to resist interest rate subsidies. Many of these problems, however, could 
be avoided by channelling finite interest rate subsidies that decline over time through 
commercial banks. This has the added advantage of drawing private sector finance 
and expertise into the land refonn process (Lyne and Darroch, 2003, p.84). 
86 
6.2.4 BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION IN LAND REFORM PROGRAMME 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
While the land reform programme faces many challenges, including the pressure to 
deliver, the government and its associates cannot afford to take short cuts when 
implementing the programme. The untangling of rights to land during rights enquiries 
should be allowed to take as much time as is needed for ensuring long lasting 
solutions. The minute details of conflicts that arise as a result of attempting to clearly 
define 'communities' should not be ignored, even though it may seem distant form the 
immediate issue at hand, in this case land rights (Kepe, 1999, p.431). 
Former minister of agriculture Derek Hanekom has been quoted as saying, "We need 
a major shift from land reform to land reform plus other things." These "other things" 
include rural job creation, intensive management assistance and public infrastructure 
development (Mail and Guardian, 1999 cited in Zimmerman, 2000, p.1455). Clearly, 
with such programmes in place the selection of beneficiaries of the land reform 
programme need no longer be demand-led, but rather targeted to the poor. 
Furthermore, the landless poor would benefit from employment programmes, land 
grants and additional safety nets as a way of making the programme more attractive to 
them. 
Such insurance in terms of Zimmerman (2000, p.1455) could cover risks and take 
many forms: Firstly, the government could sell subsidized weather insurance (not 
subject to moral hazard) that would pay off in the event of inadequate rainfall. 
Secondly, the government could make the up-front costs of the programme payable 
over three or five years, and then only in the event of integration into the farming 
economy. Lastly, the government could guarantee employment at some level of 
minimum wages. Taking the risk out of the programme would go definitely make it 
more attractive to the poor. 
To alleviate the time poverty barrier to participation, a policy option would be to 
aggressively extend government services- infrastructure, electricity, drinking water, ,. 
irrigation, education and health care to rural centres that would be foci of new 
development. Lipton and Lipton (1993) stress the importance of water control rural 
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infrastructure. They cite the example of East and Southeast Asian countries whose 
agricultural success resulted from heavy rural infrastructural investment. Essentially, 
the government would construct towns into which land reform beneficiaries could 
move and be assured of access to important services. Such a solution would keep time 
constraints to a minimum and serve as magnets for the rural economic activity that 
would provide the non-farming jobs necessary to make the programme successful 
(Zimmerman, 2000, p.1455). 
In terms ofHIV/AIDS the following is summary of policy recommendations that are 
suggested by Zwane (2001): 
Firstly, the government should conduct a broad situation analysis of the impact of 
HIV I AIDS on the land reform programme. This can be done through a study that will 
initially involve numerous communities in South Africa, followed by studies 
undertaken in other countries. The entire process can take about 5 to 10 years to 
complete, which is acceptable as land transfers are lengthy processes. Secondly, the 
government can work with NGO's to make all the HIV/AIDS statistics accessible and 
available to all planners and land reform project members, so that these statistics are 
accurately integrated in their planning. Thirdly, the government should involve key 
stakeholders in planning and research. Results that emerge from such studies will be 
easily accepted because every organisation would have participated. Fourthly, donors 
of the land reform programme should be encouraged to invest in fighting the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. Lastly, the government should include a budget line for HIV/AIDS in all 
financial planning and establish support centres where it possible for those infected 
and affected by HIV I AIDS to help deal with the associated stress and to encourage 
those in the community or region who are still productive. 
The successful implementation of these policy measures would require are- thinking 
of current government policy, sound financial planning and a realistic look at the 
impact ofHIV/AIDS on the viability of the land reform programme in South Africa. 
Overall, land reform must be solutions-orientated, actions- based, dynamic which 
works towards the restoration and redefinition of land usage, distribution and 
ownership patterns, so as to reflect the spirit and intent, and meet the expectations of 
the new South Africa (Momsen, 2004, p.4). 
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